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The subject of international trade was the primary concern of the earliest works in 
economic science and since those days of David Ricardo and Adam Smith theories of trade 
between countries have evolved into much more sophisticated and broader dimensions to 
cope with the changing patterns of human behavior. In all the theories of trade the 
production technologies of the countries in question are specified and then given the structure 
of preferences and terms of trade it is possible to say something concrete about trade patterns 
and patterns of specialization as well as consumption. However, in the midst of all these 
numerous evolutions of theories, most of the modem long-run theories of international trade 
have been based on the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-0) model or extensions of it (Kemp and Long, 
1984). 
The H-0 model assumes that trade is between two countries. In each country two 
goods are produced with two primary factors of production, capital (K) and labor (L) in a 
concave and constant returns to scale (CRS) production process. Preferences are 
everywhere identical and homothetic and perfectly competitive market conditions prevail. 
Given the above the explanations of trade then rest on four basic propositions: 
H-0: A country has a production bias towards, and hence tends to export, the 
commodity which uses intensively the factor with which it is relatively well 
endowed. 
Stolper-Samuelson ("S-SV An increase in the relative price of one commodity 
raises the real return of the factor used intensively in producing that commodity 
and lowers the real return of the other factor. 
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Rvbczvnski: If commodity prices are held fixed, an increase in the endowment 
of one factor causes a more than proportionate increase in the output of the 
commodity which uses that factor relatively intensively and an absolute decline in 
the output of the other commodity. 
Factor Price Equalization (FPEV In the global sense, under certain conditions, 
free trade in final goods alone brings about complete international equalization 
of factor prices. In the local sense, at constant commodity prices, a small change 
in a country's factor endowments does not affect factor prices (Jones and Neary, 
1984). 
This model is inherently static in the sense that it deals with trade for a given time and not 
over the whole time of existence of the country. Put in a dynamic perspective it seems to 
assume that its assumptions hold over time and, in particular, the factors of production 
provide their services forever (Kemp and Long, 1984). The immediate question that arises is; 
What if at least one of the factors or goods were an exhaustible resource, so that issues 
relating to its availability over time are not trivial. Would the H-0 model or a modified 
version of it still be able to predict trade patterns? 
The answer to this question depends in part on the importance of natural resources in 
trade between countries. Figure 1 shows the share of mineral oil and other natural resource 
extractions in trade. Data for this graph was obtained from various issues of the Statistical 
Yearbook series of the United Nations. It is clear from this that these account for an 
appreciable portion of intercountry trade. Thus it appears that modem theories of 
international trade that do not account for natural resource issues neglect a substantial 
portion of trade. 
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Crude Materials 
Figure 1; Shares of Natural Resources in Total World Trade 
There are two ways in which natural resources are important for trade analysis. First 
they can enter the production model as inputs. Secondly as noted above natural resources are 
in themselves final goods traded directly. Since the early works of Vousden (1974), Long 
(1974), and Kemp and Suzuki (1975) most of the literature on natural resource-trade issues 
have emphasized the input role of resources with very little attention on the output role. The 
implicit assumption is that some minimal processing is required for any export of a resource. 
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The motivation of this dissertation is based on two main observations. First it appears 
that most of the theoretical and empirical analyses in international trade still rely heavily on 
the static trade theorems outlined above. As much as these trade theorems are still of much 
importance today, the conditions under which they hold true are very rare in reality. We will 
investigate what happens when natural resource issues are considered and some of the 
dynamic theorems that are needed. It may be that dynamic counterparts of the static 
theorems exist in some situations. Though this work does not consider dynamic versions of 
the static trade theorems, Kemp and Long (1984) provide a useful review of that aspect of 
the literature. 
The second observation that motivates this study is a general concern in 
contemporary times about the relation between developing country debt burden and the rate 
of depletion of natural resource stocks. There is believed to be the general tendency for 
developing debtor nations to accelerate the extraction of their natural resource stocks in 
order to pay off their debt and develop their economies. We will consider this problem and 
see what happens when it is possible for the debtor nation to default. 
Dissertation Organisation 
This dissertation comprises of three separate but related papers preceded by a few 
preliminary chapters. The first paper follows deals with the static issues encountered in 
natural resource-trade models. These issues include the investigation of the conditions under 
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which static versions of the traditional trade theorems - Rybczynski, Stolper-Samuelson, 
Heckscher-Ohlin and factor price equalization - hold. In the first paper we will concern 
ourselves with the Rybczynski and Stolper-Samuelson theorems. The second paper of this 
dissertation deals with the dynamic issues of natural resource-trade models. In that paper we 
will consider production and trade patterns in the presence of natural resource extraction. 
We generally assume that even if there is replenishment of the natural resource stock, it 
generally is exhaustible. 
As the third paper is somewhat different from the first two we did not give an 
elaborate review of the literature associated with it in the general literature review above. 
We have chosen to defer this so that an extensive review of the literature associated with the 
third paper is included as part of that paper. The third paper deals with natural resource 
extraction issues of particular interest to developing countries. Issues of interest include the 
debt burden of these countries, creditor response to default risk and their implications for 
natural resource extraction in those countries. 
Each of the three papers includes a list of references cited in that paper and also a 
concluding section summarizing the results of that paper. We conclude with a general 
summary section for all the work embodied in the dissertation and a list of the references 
cited in the chapters preceding the first paper. 
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THEORETICAL MODELS 
Essentially, the process of modeling natural resource issues in trade involves either of 
two approaches (Segerson, 1988): 
(a) Adding natural resource stocks to a trade model as inputs or outputs or both OR 
(b) Adding trade possibilities to a closed economy version of a natural resource model. 
This process is not that simple, however, because there are some very important 
differences between trade and resource models. Resources are usually modeled in dynamic 
partial equilibrium frameworks emphasizing externalities in their analyses. Externalities result 
because most resources are common property and there is little incentive to maintain a 
complete set of property rights. Trade models on the other hand are usually static and for the 
most part, ignore externalities; however, they are based on a more general equilibrium 
approach (Antle and Howitt, 1988). 
When the resource stock is regarded as an input in the production process we find 
some similarities between this and the use of capital stocks in conventional models and so it 
might seem that resource issues can be incorporated in trade models by simply treating them 
as capital stocks. Just as the levels of capital stocks change over time so do the levels of 
resource stocks and the d>Tiomics of resource stocks are at least as important as those of 
capital stocks in the production model. However, some important differences are worth 
noting. First, the resource stock is usually not (completely) owned by the firm and so it 
usually does not internalize the effects of its actions on the common stock so that private 
decisions may not be and usually are not socially optimal (Antle and Howitt, 1988). 
Secondly whereas capital stocks change due to investment and depreciation, resource stocks 
are augmented through biological or natural replenishment and depleted by use. So while the 
augmentation of capital stocks is usually a choice variable and its depletion exogenous, the 
reverse holds for resources (Segerson, 1988). Furthermore, the use of capital leads to 
depletion in its quality, i.e. heterogeneity in its composition results while in the case of 
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resources changes in quantity rather than quality occur in most cases Kemp and Long (1984) 
with few caveats. 
There are many and varied treatments of the resource-trade linkage. Withagen (1985) 
considers all models to be either partial equilibrium where they deal with the problem of 
optimal exploitation of a natural resource stock when world market prices or demand 
schedules are given or general equilibrium where demand is derived within the model. In this 
section we first present the basic essentials common to all modeling approaches. Then it will 
be appropriate to dilate on the various extensions that have occurred in the literature. The 
problems encountered in this area of economics must necessarily be modeled in a dynamic 
setting. The essential components of each modeling approach are the following; 
1 • Capital and Variable Input Endowments: 
This is common to all conventional trade and resource models and is an essential 
feature here as well. Factor endovraients are bounded at a given time but there is always a 
positive amount of every essential factor (available) at all times. The conventional H-0 
model assumes we are interested in only two such variable inputs. 
2. Natural Resource Endowments: 
This is an addition to conventional trade models. There is a natural resource stock 
which is bounded at a given time and possibly exhaustible so that we may have a zero 
endowment level after some finite time. We distinguish three cases: 
(a) Exhaustible and Norirenewablc: Kere the planning horizon involving the resource 
allocation is finite, after which no resource stock is available. 
(b) Renewable but Exhaustible: Some resources are renewable but exhaustible. The 
dynamics is different from (a) but the period of resource use is finite as well because the 
stock is used up over a finite horizon. 
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(c) Renewable and Nonexhaustible: Few resources come under an essentially infinite horizon 
of existence in the sense that the usual depletion rate is highly superseded by the rate of 
natural or artificial replenishment. The planning horizon for the resource stock is usually 
infinite. 
It is useful to note that whether the resource stock horizon is finite or infinite the 
planning horizon for the whole optimization problem is usually infinite. So in the case of an 
exhaustible resource, extraction occurs over a finite portion of the whole optimization 
sequence. 
Another issue of importance is whether or not the resource is extracted costlessly. As 
we shall see this assumption has implications as to whether or not a period of incomplete 
specialization intervenes between any two extremes of complete specialization. 
3. Production Function: 
All goods in the economy are produced nonjointly. Each production function exhibits 
strict quasi-concavity and for virtually all cases, constant returns to scale (homogeneous of 
degree one). N goods are produced each with m inputs some of which are natural resource 
inputs, exhaustible or inexhaustible. 
4. Capital Stock Dynamics: 
In some cases the dynamics of capital use is explicitly outlined (Antle and Howitt, 
1988). Capital changes due to investment and depreciation. 
5. Resource Stock Dynamics: 
This is a common feature in all models. The resource stock changes due to extraction 
and replenishment. Corresponding to whether or not the type of resource is renewable we 
have the following dynamics; 
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(a) Nonrenewable Resources 
The changes in the resource stock are due only to the rates of extraction over time. 
(b) Renewable Resources 
The resource stock changes over time because of extraction as well as natural or artificial 
replenishment. 
(c) Replaceable Resources (Backstops) 
When a country has more than one source of endowment for a particular use the extraction 
of a resource stock may be replaced by the extraction of another. 
6. Price/Market Structure or Trading Regime: 
Most models assume that producers in a given country are in a perfectly competitive 
market. Furthermore the small country assumption of exogenous prices is usually made. In 
some cases (e.g. Kemp and Long, 1980b) the terms of trade is assumed to be constant as 
well, while others allow it to grow at an exponential rate (e.g. Kemp and Long, 1982). 
Usually, sticking as close as possible to the H-0 model it is assumed that only two countries 
are involved in trade. Sometimes other market structures are assumed. Some studies deal 
with a canei with the existence of a competitive fiinge. Others consider monopsony-
monopoly interactions. 
7. Borrowing and Lending Possibilities: 
One other aspect of variation involves international lending or borrowing possibilities. 
1111^  oi^ O iia^  a i^cai uii iiic iiaiuic ui iiic vjujcviivc aiiu iii lav^ i iiic wiiOic 
modeling process. Kemp and Long (1984) note that the assumption of lending and 
borrowing possibilities for a small country in which all inputs are natural resource variables 
leads to a trivial solution. However, for the case where at least some inputs are not natural 
resource variables this assumption leads to a nontrivial solution. At any rate assuming perfect 
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borrowing and lending on international markets means that maximization of the discounted 
stream of output is necessary for the maximization of discounted utility (Segerson, 1988). 
8. Preference Structure: 
The standard assumption of identical preferences within a country is maintained. Also 
it is usually assumed that preferences are identical across countries. However, in some 
studies preferences are assumed to differ, or different rates of time preferences across 
countries are assumed. 
9. Objective Function: 
The utility (or indirect utility) function of the representative agent of the economy is 
the primary objective function, discounted by a positive and for the most part constant rate of 
time preference. The optimization is done over an infinite horizon subject to the various 
input and nonnegativity constraints. However, as stated earlier, when borrowing and lending 
possibilities exist a necessary condition for utility maximization is the maximization of the 
discounted stream of output. Output is discounted by the (not necessarily constant) rate of 
intdroct pn/4 mpvim**7ptf/^r* pler> or* 
Having spelt out the essential components of each of the models we now review in 
more detail the basic structures involved. All the above components are important. 
However, the models in literature are mainly discussed under three of them, viz.; production 
structure, resource dynamics and market structure. Because treatment of the components is 
not disjoint we shall consider the models under these three headings. Before we discuss them 
it is useful at this stage to introduce notation that will be employed in the following sections. 
Useful Notation 
Define X/ , /" = l,.,w as the goods produced in country J. 
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Let V, K and E be the variable Ricardian (primary) input, capital input and Hotelling (natural 
resource) input vectors respectively. Let P, W, R and S be the respective price vectors for 
goods and Ricardian, capital and Hotelling factors. Because of the dynamic nature of such 
models it is important to see the variables as sequences over time and sometimes it will be 
necessary to compare sequences. In that case we would use the following notation: 
Define y^'^) = (yKy^^^,.-) to be the sequence of the vector y fi-om time k to the end of the 
planning horizon, which in most cases is infinite. When we write 
y ( k ) > z ( k )  
we mean that fi"om time k onwards, every time t element of y is greater than the 
corresponding time t element of z for all t > k. The same holds for single variables so that 
y (k)i> y (k)j 
implies yi exceeds yj in value for all time beginning at time k. 
Any vector y follows a given sequence from time zero onwards if undisturbed. 
However, a disturbance at time k in the system, such as price or endowment changes, may 
result in a different path for the vector. In order to distinguish the disturbed fi"om the 
undisturbed time paths we denote the latter (undisturbed) as and the former (disturbed) 
N 
sequence as so that 
<y':) 
means the disturbance in the system resulted in higher values than y for all time following 
that disturbance. 
We now proceed to review the models under the three main categories listed above. 
Models Based On Differences In The Production Structure 
Virtually all the models here are distinguished by the type of input vector involved. 
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Anti H-0 Models 
Kemp and Long (1984) discuss this model which is the polar extreme (opposite) of 
the standard H-0 model. Two final goods are produced nonjointly by two raw materials. 
The production fiinction exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS). Both raw material inputs 
E., i = 1,2, are obtained fi-om natural resource stocks i = 1,2. In their model they 
assumed the stock is exhaustible and 
= F'iE'uE'z)] = 1,2 s.t. > 0 only if£,, £, > 0 
nonrenewable. Furthermore extraction is costless. The production functions are 
where E/ is the rate at which the ith resource is used in the jth industry. So given 
P{t) = P^l maximized revenue in terms of is given as 
Y, = X\P,E„E,) + PX\P,E,,E,) 
= Y\P,E„E,) = Ey(P,s) 
where s = E^ IE^ since each production function exhibits CRS. 
Thus the function has a linear facet between two critical values el and Su of the input ratio 
but is otherwise strictly concave. 
Given identical and time separable preferences in the economy we have the 
optimization problem for the small countr}' given as : 
i " , I e x p ( - pt)W[y' Ez I  for p > 0 
' ' - 0 
s . t .  R, i t )  =  -£ , (! )  
R i ( t ) > 0  w h e r e  i ? ,  ( 0 )  >  0  i s  g i v e n  
£ , ( 0 > 0  
nriiA -firct imnUr 
The authors then went ahead to establish the following conclusions. 
(a) Define the initial resource endowment ratio as R(0) = R2(0)/Ri(0). Then 
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R(0), constant if R(0) <s^ 
^(t)= j £(Oe(£^,fy) 
[ R(0),  constant if /?(0) > Sy 
However, total output is fully determined regardless of the value of R(0). 
(b) Extraction of the resources grows at the rate p/T| where 
^ / ^ ? Y ,  '  
the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to income, Y i. 
Modified versions of the Rybczynski, Stolper-Samuelson, H-0 and factor price equalization 
theorems hold: We assume that both goods are produced before and after the disturbance in 
the system. 
(c) Rybczynski: 
Suppose Xi is relatively intensive in its use of Ei. Given a time k increase in Ri(0), the initial 
stock of the iih Fcsourcc, wc will have 
andA',/"' 
where = XJ X^. 
(d)Stolper-Samuelson: 
Suppose there is a time k increase in Pj, the given price of the jth good. Then if V] is used 
intensively in good j, we will have 
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where Xn = dX\ldW\ i=l,2 and a reduction in the marginal product of the other factor. 
(e) Heckscher-Ohlin: 
If preferences are strictly convex, homothetic and identical in each of the two free-
trading countries and if the rate of time preferences is everywhere the same and marginal 
utility is of constant elasticity, then there is a trading equilibrium with constant terms of trade 
and for as long as production continues, the country wWch is relatively well endowed with 
the ith Hotelling factor will export the commodity which is relatively intensive in its use of 
that factor. 
Ono (1982) and others (e.g. Tawada, 1982) have shown that the strict sense of specialization 
implied here is hinged on the assumption of the model such as zero or constant extraction 
costs and that relaxation of that assumption will lead to various shades of incomplete 
specialization. 
(f) Factor Price Equalization: 
If all of the above conditions for the H-0 theory hold then there exists an equilibrium 
terms of trade and an associated cone of diversification which is the same for all points of 
time at which production takes place. Furthermore in each country the extraction ratio s(t) is 
constant being equal to the initial endowment ratio. Then if and only if the extraction vectors 
of the two countries lie in the common cone of diversification, the marginal product of each 
resource will be the same in both countries. 
Hybrid Models 
In these models (e.g. Kemp and Long, 1984, 1982, 1980b, 1980d and 1978) we have 
two inputs, one Hotelling and one Ricardian in a CRS production function each country 
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producing (usually) two goods. Staying close to the notation above, we can write the 
maximum total output in terms of the numeraire (good 1) as 
y; = x\p,Ey)+PX\p,E,v) = Y\P,E,V) 
which is also concave with a linear facet between two critical values, E] and Eu- Assuming 
international borrowing and lending is possible at a given and constant rate of interest, then 
the maximization of discounted utility requires maximization of discounted output as a 




s.t .  R(t) = -E{t) 
R{t) > 0 where i?(0) > 0 is given 
E(0>0 
Solving this the following theorems can be proved. 
1. Rybczynski; 
Suppose R(0) takes on values such that along an optimal trajectory there exists some 
iAi«,w voa \ji. vAuiiii^ wiiAvii wawii Id rxidu mat yv| id iiioiv iiitwiidivc 
in natural resource use. If at time t=k R(0) is raised, then 
Xf > X,' and < X.^  
We also have the following: 
2. An increase in Pi relative to P2 at t=k leads to 
( a ) — < O a n d — < 0  
(b) an increase in the interval of time over which the resource-intensive good is produced and 
a decrease in the interval over which the other good is produced. 
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3. Heckscher-Ohlin; 
If preferences are identical and homothetic in each of two free-trading countries then 
the country which initially is relatively well endowed with the resource will always export the 
relatively resource-intensive good. 
Under an alternative assumption international borrowing and lending is not possible. 




s.t .  Rit)  = -Eii) 
R(t) > 0 where R(P) > 0 is given 
£(/) > 0 
In this situation specialization is not always complete but rather a gradual transition 
from complete specialization in the resource intensive good through various shades of 
incomplete specialization to complete specialization in the other good. All the three theorems 
above for the Icnuing-borrowing Situation hold here as well with minor modifications. 
Generalized Models 
A straight forward generalization of the hybrid model gives rise to models in which 
production employs the use of m3 Hotelling and m] Ricardian factors where mi>l, m3>l 
and mi+m3>3. This class of models includes the generalized H-0 and generalized ami H-0 




In this model mi=2 while m3>l. The case where ms equals 1 is discussed variously 
in the literature (eg. Kemp and Long, 1984 and 1980c). The production function is CRS and 
is usually presented as being homogeneous of degree 1-a (0<a<l) in the Ricardian factors 
and homogeneous of degree a in the Hotelling factor, viz.; 
Xj = (Ei)«Fj(V)i,vj2) 
where F-l is homogeneous of degree 1-a. 
The immediate conclusion fi-om these studies is that the competitive allocation of Ricardian 
factors is independent of the rate of resource extraction. Further propositions depend upon 
whether or not the small competitive economy is able to borrow or lend at a given rate of 
interest. We consider this possibility first and then the case where it is not possible. 
(i) When International Borrowing and Lending is Possible. 
When there is a perfect international capital market a necessary condition for the 
maximization of discounted utility is the maximization of the present value of output, so that 
we have first of all 
maxf t _ \ oyrT^(-\ ^\r1c-\V ( P (Tl/ 
• ^ 0  0  
s.t .  R{t) = -E{t) 
Rit) > 0 where i?(0) > 0 is given 
E{t) > 0 
The following propositions are obtained firom the optimization process: 
(1) Extraction grows at the rate -r(t)/(l-a). 
(2) The rate of extraction and the interval over which it occurs is independent of the constant 
terms of trade and the Ricardian factor endovraient. 
(3) Rybczynski Theorem: 
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Suppose both goods are produced along an optimal trajectory before and after a time k 
increase in the ith Ricardian endowment Vi. Then if Xi is more intensive in its use of Vi than 
X2 A'f > and Xj < which means that xf > where x^ = XJ X^ 
Also if a is sufficiently small dXi/Xi > dV\fV\. 
(4) Stolper-Samuelson Theorem: 
Suppose both goods are produced along an optimal trajectory before and after a time k 
increase in P^, the given price of the jth good. Then from time k onwards the marginal 
product of the factor that is used intensively in the jth good increases above its original level 
and it also increases relative to the marginal product of the other factor.. 
(5) Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem; 
If preferences are the same and homothetic in each of two free-trading countries then there is 
a world trading and capital market equilibrium with constant terms of trade and if the country 
initially relatively well endowed with the ith Ricardian factor exports at all, it will be the 
commodity which is relatively intensive in its use of that factor and this equilibrium is unique 
if both goods are demanded at all positive price ratios. Furthermore the rate of interest is 
constant if the elasticity of marginal utility is constant and the rate of time preference is 
identical everywhere. 
(6) Factor Price Equalization: 
Given the above conditions there exists an equilibrium terms of trade and an associated cone 
of diversification which is the same for all points of time at which production occurs and if 
and only if the Ricardian endoAvment vectors lie in the common cone of diversification then 
the ratio of marginal products of the Ricardian factors is the same in each country. 
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(ii) When International Borrowing and Lending is not Possible. 
In the absence of international borrowing and lending the utility function and the 
social rate of time preference enter the objective function of producers and influence the 
optimal production path. The optimization problem is 
maxf _ _ 
Jexp(-p/Mr'(P,£(/),F„F,),/>>// 
^ 0 
s.t .  Kit) = -E{t) 
R{t) > 0 where R(Q) > 0 is given 
E{t) > 0 
What we get fi^om this is the following: 
(1) Extraction grows at the rate -p/[l-a(l-hi)] where ti is the elasticity of marginal utility 
with respect to income. 
If r\ is constant (independent of Y and P), then the rate of extraction and therefore the 
interval over which it occurs is independent of the constant terms of trade and Ricardian 
factor endowments. 
(2) R.ybcz>T.ski Theorem; 
Assume Xi is more intensive in its use of factor i. Given a time t increase in Vi 
Further if t\ is constant, then and dXi/Xi > dViA^j. 
(3) Stolper-Samuelson Theorem; 
For a time k increase in Pj, MPj rises relative to the marginal product of the other factor and 
if n. is constant, then from time k onwards the marginal product of the factor that is used 
intensively in the jth good increases relative to that of the other factor. Furthermore, if is 
constant, then the marginal product of the good j intensive factor actually rises to a level that 
is higher from time k onwards than it was before. 
The H-0 and FPE theorems hold as in (i). 
20 
Generalized Anti H-0 
For this class of models (eg. Kemp and Long, 1984) we have mi>l while m3=2. 
Each good Xj, j=l,...,n is produced as 
where \\i and ^ are homogeneous of degree one. 
Kemp and Long report that all the theorems for the anti H-0 models hold here as well when 
generalized. 
Hybrid Resource-Trade (HRT) Models 
In their article Antle and Howitt (1988) develop "hybrid" resource-trade (HRT) 
models to quantify resource-trade linkages. Realizing the central role of the production 
process in this linkage they used a lucid four-step procedure in their presentation; 
1. Derivation of the linkage between agricultural production and natural resources 
2. Derivation of the linkage between agricultural production and trade. 
3. Joining the two linkages to get HRT models 
4. Use of the HRT models to analyze policy issues. 
x i ic  uadiu  cddci iLio id  u i  p iuuuci iu i i  l i iuuc i  a ic  a5  lOi iOw^.  
Production function: 
qit = fi(sit,zit,rit) i = l,...,I 
where sit, zit are vectors of allocated resource stocks and purchased capital and rjt is a vector 
of vsrisbls factor inputs 
Capital stock dynamics: 
zit+1 - zit = -5zit + vit 
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where 5 is the depreciation rate and vit represents investment. 
Resource stock dynamics: 
St+1 - St = g(sit,...,sit.rit,...,rit) 
where ^^.,3;, < S, ands^, > 0, > 0 
The optimization problem then becomes the maximization of the discounted stream of net 
returns over factor costs and capital investment expenditures subject to the initial resource 
and capital stocks, stock dynamics, and nonnegativity constraints: 
Given their standard assumptions trade is completely defined by a system of excess 
supply (or demand) functions. Define 
ESm = ESm(Pm); ESm < 0 for m c I, ESm > 0 for m c X 
where ESm - excess supply for commodity m, m=l,...,M traded goods 
Pm = world price of m, I = set of importing countries 
X = set of exporting countries 
In conventional trade theory factors are assumed to be immobile across countries. 
However, given the strong linkage between factors and resource stocks and the fact that 
trade in factors is significant in the real world, we need to consider factor trade flows as well. 
max J= = &„ +v„ i = 1,.. . , / ,  
•^f=0 
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As the authors pointed out, we obtain product supply and factor demands, and r^, from 
the profit function via Hoteiling's lemma. 
From these we obtain the product and factor excess supply functions for all countries, 
i and goods, m: 
= mczM (A) 
ES„ = ESJ,P,w,z„,S„l w c M (B) 
Equation systems (A) and (B) completely define trade in the m goods and they provide the 
agricultural production-trade linkage. 
Joining the above linkages the authors produced the HRT models. The kind of 
model obtained depends on the status of the resource stock which in turn depends on the 
kind of optimization problem that was solved. 
SOCIALLY OPTIMAL HRT; If the individual solving the optimization problem was the 
central planner who seeks to maximize society's welfare, or if all producers internalize the 
effects of their decisions on the resource stock the result would be the socially optimal HRT 
model. 
HRT FOR EXTERNALITIES NOT INTERNALIZED: If the producers do not internalize 
the externality the solution to their optimization is privately optimal but not socially optimal 
in the absence of appropriate penalties. 
HRT FOR A REGULATED EXTERNALITY; Regulation involves the imposition of a 
penalty for misuse of the resource stock. If the penalty function correctly incorporates all the 
resource costs the HRT would be socially optimal, otherwise it would not. The kind of 
penalty imposed depends on the information available to the regulatory agency and also its 
own objective for we cannot presume its objective to be always equal to the social optimum. 
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Models Based On Differences In Resource Dynamics 
The nature of resource dynamics is a very important distinguishing feature among the 
various models. Virtually all the models we have considered so far assume that the resource 
stock is nonrenewable and non-replaceable (eg. Kemp and Long, 1980b and 1980c). In this 
section we note that when that assumption is relaxed the optimization problem becomes more 
complex and the possibility of non-trivial steady states in which various rates of extraction are 
matched by rates of renewal (or replacement) becomes more apparent (Kemp and Long, 
1984). Our attention here is directed at showing the changes that occur in the optimization 
problems due to varying assumptions of resource dynamics rather than showing which, if any, 
of the standard theorems are violated. 
Nonrenewable And Non-Replaceable Resources 
This has been the underlying assumption of resource dynamics in most of the models 
discussed above. For any resource stock i=l,...,m the rate of extraction depends only on the 
rates of use of the resources in the n goods. 
Renewable Resources 
When the resource is renewable the time rate of change of the stock depends not only 
on the rate of extraction but also on the rate at which it is being renewed either naturally or 
artificially or both. The rate of renewal or growth is usually posited as a function g() of the 
stock. 
It is easily conceivable that an economy may have more than one natural resource 
endowment serving similar purposes so that in a sense the various resource endowments are 
substitutes. Kemp and Long (1984) consider the case where energy can be obtained from oil 
or from solar sources. In this case the optimization problem is divided into segments, mostly 
finite . For each segment one or more resource types Rj are extracted for use in production. 
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This is followed by another segment having a different combination of resource types. Thus 
for any period of time te[Tic,Tk+l] suppose that the complete form of the objective function 
is given as Y(). 
Replaceable Resources [Backstops] 
For the period t6[Tk+l,Tk+2] and so on different combinations of resource 
endowments are called upon for production. The time intervals are themselves choice 
variables of the whole optimization problem, chosen to maximize the whole discounted 
stream of the objective function (maximand) for the infinite planning horizon. 
Differences In Price/Market Structure Or Trading Regime 
For most of the models described above the authors assumed the conditions of perfect 
competition to prevail. However, it is conceivable and in fact a reality that some resources 
such as fossil fuels are not traded in such markets. In the literature attention has been drawn 
to other market structures and the most firequentiy used are caneis and monopoly-
monopsony relations. The major motivation for noncompetitive market structures is the 
uneven distribution of resource deposits across the globe. When noncompetitive market 
structures are considered the result is usually dependent upon whether it is price or quantity 
that is the strategic choice variable of concern. We proceed to describe briefly the 
implications of such market structures, with most reference to price setting behaviors. 
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Cartels 
Studies on this type of market structure assume that the cartel is operating in the 
midst of a competitive fringe. The nature of the optimization problem of a country therefore 
depends upon the actions of the cartel and whether it is a member or not. The approach to 
analysis then involves a derivation of the cartel's (pricing) behavior and the implied behavior 
of the competitive fnnge. Since in most cases the competitive fringe takes the price set by 
the cartel as given we have a Stackelberg rather than a Nash-Coumot setting. 
Newbery (1981) analyzed the world oil market with the assumption that OPEC acts 
as a cartel facing a competitive fringe. His concern was with the issue of dynamic 
inconsistency. He argued that there is a high incentive for the cartel to deviate from its 
previously announced price path in the case of nonbinding contracts because its rational 
expectations equilibrium would be the price path which maximizes its present value 
discounted profit at each successive date rather than the initial date only. He shows, 
however, that the Nash-Coumot equilibrium is dynamically consistent and is the best 
approximation to the Stackelberg outcome. He uses a graphical approach (as opposed to 
dynamic programming techniques) to derive the price path of the cartel, arguing that dynamic 
programming techniques usually do not expose solutions which are dynamically inconsistent. 
There are essentially two possible phases 
(a) A competitive phase during which the fringe operates and 
(b) A monopolistic phase during which the fringe does not operate 
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Whether one or both phases occur and the order in which they do depends on the 
assumptions of the model 
Kemp and Long (1984) also consider binding and nonbinding contracts for cartels and show 
that dynamic inconsistency is highly probable for nonbinding contracts. 
Monopoly-Monopsony Interactions 
In a series of papers some authors (e.g. Chiarella, 1980, and Kemp and Long, 1980e 
and 1980f) considered the problem of trade in natural resource deposits when one country or 
group of countries is resource-rich while the other is resource-poor. In the extreme case we 
may have a monopoly created by the resource-rich and/or monopsony by the resource-poor. 
The implications of the market structure depend on whether or not the monopoly can utilize 
its resource deposits domestically, i.e., what resource disposal options are open to it. It also 
depends upon the leverage of the monopsony in terms of the power it commands in trade 
with the resource monopoly in other goods. Most authors are of the opinion that the 
monopsony can exploit the monopoly if the latter has no other use for the resource. 
However, if the monopoly can utilize the resource domestically it is less susceptible to 
exploitation. 
The case of a monopoly and monopsony in the presence of a cartel is also considered 
in the literature (Kemp and Suzuki, 1975). 
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EMPIRICAL MODELS 
Most of the attempts at modeling resource-trade linkages have been theoretical. 
Empirical models are difficult to estimate and have been largely avoided. The importance of 
empirical tests to theoretical models can be appreciated when one recalls the Leontief 
paradox, wluch is not without criticisms, however. Empirical tests for the above models are 
needed to help improve their applicability to real world conditions. 
Segerson (1988) suggests that the various kinds of environmental externalities should 
be taxonomized to streamline empirical evaluations. The key problem remaining is still the 
valuation of the externality. Abbott and Haley (1988) suggest two alternative approaches at 
estimation: 
(a) Linear Programming Economywide models as popularized in the development literature 
(b) Computable General Equilibrium models though in the past these have hardly ever been 
used to incorporate externalities. 
Theoretically we expect environmental control costs to lead to increased 
specialization in the production of polluting products in countries with less stringent 
environmental policies and the reverse to hold for countries with more strict policies 
(McGuire (1982), Pethig (1976) and Siebert (1977)). However, some studies have cast 
doubt on the significance of this seemingly plausible notion . Some interesting studies by 
Pearson (1985) and Walter (1982) using the location of industry approach also find that 
evidence is lacking in support of the hypotheses that 'dirty' industries move out of the stricter 
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countries (industrial-flight hypothesis) to the less strict countries (pollution-haven 
hypothesis). Following Learner (1984) and others (e.g. Bowen and Learner, 1987) the 
objective of Tobey (1990) was to use a Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model to perform an 
empirical test on this notion. 
Tobey considered the effects of domestic envirorunental policies on the patterns of 
world trade. He tested empirically the hypothesis that the degree of environmental policy 
restrictions have no effect on the comparative advantage of countries as reflected by the 
patterns of world trade. This was a relatively simple model, using cross-sectional 1975 data 
for 23 countries. The HOV model fitted in the usual way is; 
Nj = Vjp + pj 
He included a dummy variable (Dj) representing stringency of pollution control measures in a 
country 
Nj = VjP + Djpk+1 + Mj 
and fitted the above system by ordinary least squares (OLS). 
Nj is a Ixn vector of net exports of n commodities by country j, Vj is a Ixk vector of (k) 
resource endowments of country j, P is a kxn matrix of parameters for country j, Pk+1 is a 
Ixn vector of dummy variable parameters and |aj is the disturbance term. Though he did not 
make any explicit assumption regarding the disturbance term the use of OLS regression 
techniques presumes that it has a spherical distribution and in particular 
" MVN[0,c7-I] 
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which is to say the disturbances are distributed multivariate normal with zero mean vector 
and variance matrix a^I. This is needed to ensure unbiasedness and other nice properties of 
the parameter estimates. 
Data on Dj was obtained from a 1976 UNCTAD survey by Walter and Ugelow (1979). He 
divided the n commodities into five groups and run separate regressions for each of them. He 
concluded that because bk+l, the estimated value of Pk+l is not statistically significant in any 
case environmental policy stringency has not affected trade patterns appreciably. 
To give fiirther proof of his findings Tobey used a second procedure, an omitted 
variable test. He considers the bias in the regression residuals that is caused by omitting Dj 
from the equation system. His findings confirm the previous conclusion that environmental 
policy stringency has no appreciable effect on trade patterns. He then extends the HOV 
model to account for non-homothetic preferences and then scale economies and product 
differentiation. Finally a fixed effects empirical test also leads to the conclusion that policy 
stringency has no appreciable effect on patterns of trade. 
Bowen (1983) considered the impact of changes in international resource distribution 
on U.S. comparative advantage. Using regression techniques and graphical analyses he 
studies capital, skilled, semiskilled and unskilled labor and arable land distribution patterns 
vis-a-vis comparative advantage over five years. He concludes that factor distribution is an 
important determinant of U.S. comparative advantage. He used a similar empirical model as 
Tobey except that he was not interested in environmental policy impacts and so did not 
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include a policy stringency term. However, performing the analysis over five years represents 
an improvement over Tobey since it is difficult to say anything about trade patterns from a 
one year result. At any rate there appears to be considerable problems with both models. 
Firstly it seems that 'simplistic' OLS regression of net exports on factor endowments 
may not account for most of the major determinants of trade patterns. It is conceivable that 
patterns of trade have been influenced by political factors and other shock terms that are not 
very far fetched. Thus neglection of these leads to spurious results. In Tobey one also sees 
the problem of how to group countries for policy stringency. Since the grouping was done 
on the basis of level of development the total effects of policy stringency was masked. Some 
other grouping could lead to different resuhs. However, these are rare attempts and 
represent a considerable achievement. Notable areas of improvement needed in the empirical 
literature are: 
1. Choice of relevant variables. 
2. Nature of the dependent variable. 
3. Functional form to be estimated. 
4. Choice of empirical technique. 
5. The most appropriate way to represent the environmental policy component 
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PAPER 1: 
STATIC TRADE THEOREMS IN THE GENERALIZED H-0 MODEL 
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1: INTRODUCTION 
In various papers, Kemp and Long (e.g. 1979, 1980, 1982 and 1984) established that 
when natural resources are incorporated as inputs in a trade model, the standard static 
versions of the traditional trade theorems hold, and that dynamic versions of these could be 
obtained as well. In all these papers the authors assumed that the natural resource intensities 
in the two goods produced were equal. The primary goal of this paper is to see how the 
standard trade theorems are affected when we extend the Generalized H-0 framework of 
Kemp-Long (hereafter K-L). Only two of the theorems - Rybczynski and Stolper-Samuelson 
- will be considered here. In another paper where dynamic issues are brought up we will give 
attention to production patterns. Let us begin by taking a closer look at the K-L framework. 
In the K-L model two goods are produced v^ath two Ricardian inputs V \ and V2 and a 
natural resource input, E. The technology of each good exhibits constant returns to scale and 
separability between the natural resource input and an aggregate, <f) , of the Ricardian inputs 




where / and Ej are respectively the amounts of Ricardian input , and natural resource 
input E, used in good j. The natural resource input is extracted costlessly from a given 
deposit of the resource stock. Everything else is just as in the standard H-0 model: 
preferences are identical in the two trading countries and there is no uncertainty. 
Solving the first order conditions for optimal factor allocations to maximize income K-




where = —, j = 1,2, i = 1,2. 
and P, and are the exogenous prices of AT, and X, respectively. The conclusion from the 
above is apparent. The competitive allocation of , and , (the Ricardian factors) is 
independent of E, the rate of extraction of the natural resource. This, in the K-L study was 
the principal lemma which drove all the results they obtained. They showed that dynamic 
versions of all the standard H-O theorems held when there is borrowing/lending in perfect 
international capital markets. Even in the absence of perfect capital markets recognizable 
versions of the standard H-0 theorems were obtained. 
It is important, however, to note that even though they allowed the relative intensities 
of , and 2 to differ across the two goods, the relative intensities of A', and in E were the 
same. Thus their results apply only in the special case where this is true. In practice, goods 
produced generally have different natural resource intensities. It is to account for this 
difference that we extend the K-L model below. We will also introduce the possibility that 
extraction of the natural resource entails some cost and to make this nontrivial we shall 
assume positive marginal extraction costs. But first let us consider an initial extension where 
natural resource intensities differ but extraction costs are zero. 
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2: THE GENERALIZED H-0 MODEL WHEN NATURAL RESOURCE 
Everything else is the same as in K-L. We obtain the K-L model as a special case by setting 
a = p. In the present model we shall assume that international borrowing and lending is 
possible in perfect capital markets so that a necessary condition for the maximization of 
discounted utility is the maximization of the present value of the income stream (Segerson, 
1988). Thus we can solve the optimization problem in two stages: 
Stage I: Given the level of E for a specific time, optimize the allocation of the three factors 
among the two goods - a static problem. 
Stage II: Given the optimum allocation of factors (and hence optimized national revenue) 
derive the time path of E that maximizes the discounted stream of income - a dynamic 
problem. 
As mentioned earlier our focus in this paper is on the Stage I problem, to which we now turn. 
At each point in time we have a fixed stock of each of two Ricardian factors. 
Assuming a given level of natural resource extraction our static problem is to choose the 
allocation of the three factors that maximizes total income at a point in time. For notational 
convenience let the two Ricardian factors be labor, L, and capital, K so that 
INTENSITIES DIFFER 
Our initial extension of the K-L model gives us: 
(4) 
(5) 
X, = j = 1,2, a, = a, a, =0. (6) 
Our static problem then becomes more formally. 
(7) 
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The Lagrangian for this problem can be defined as; 
1 = + k,{E-E,-E.]+?. . [K-K,-K.- \  +  k^[L-L,-L^]  (8) 
where A,., / = 1,2,3 are multipliers. 
The first order conditions for an interior solution are: 
=0 (9) 
E.:PP^E.^'<j>,^-^-X,=0 (10) 
= 0 (11) 
Z.: (1 -P)P.E.^(!>;''- ;i3 = 0 (12) 
/:,:(l-a)/^£,V,-V„-^3=0 (13) 
/:,:(l-)ff)P,£/<i3-V2. = 0 (14) 
where o,, = —- and = —- . 
It is readily apparent from the above system that the usual result for a competitive 
allocation of factors is realized - for each factor, marginal products across final goods are 
equalized: 


















It is the ratio of marginal factor products in the intermediate goods, —, that reflects the 
h 
competitive allocation of Ricardian factors. An implied result from the above is that 
— = — as also expected. Let us define this as 
9^ 11 1^2 
= (18) 
Vn <P\2 
Solving for n from (16) one obtains 
09) (l-/7)a(«>,/(»,) 
The interpretation of this is that the allocation of Ricardian factors is dependent upon the rate 
( E  / £ , )  
of natural resource use in the two goods except in the extreme case where — 
i<t>\ I ^2)  
is a constant. Recall that we may solve the above system to obtain £, = £,(£, .K', L, fj, A), 
KJ = K.(E,K,L,P^,P2), and L^ = L.{E,K,L,P^,P^) generally nonlinear functions in their 
arguments. Thus we may unally conclude in contrast to the K-L result that: 
Lemma 1: 
When the natural resource intensities differ across the two goods the competitive allocations 
of the Ricardian factors is a function of the rate of extraction, E, of the natural resource stock. 
As we turn to our analysis of the Rybczynski and Stolper-Samuelson theorems it 
would be much easier and more insightfiil to use a dual approach to the above problem. 
Furthermore to make the analysis more tractable we shall impose more structure on the 
technology. Specifically we assume from here on that the intermediate goods and are 
also of Cobb Douglas constant returns form in the labor and capital inputs: 
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I -1 
(j, ,  = L.'K;-", a €(0,l), b €(0,1). (20) 
Let be the wage rate for labor, R the rental rate for capital and Pe the price of the natural 
resource input. Then corresponding to the above production technology the cost function of 
the first good, will be; 
C, = (21) 
where = {a''[a(l-a)]''^''"^[(l-a)(l-a)y'"''^'"''^} ' 
Similarly the cost function for the second good is given as 
a = (22) 
where = {/? ^ [6(1 - p )]'^'-^^[(l - &)(1 - p 
Thus we know that 
•^ = 1 = ,23) 
oX^ 
^ = P  =  ( 2 4 )  
Hence by Shepherd's lemma the input allocations are given as 
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Applying the three factor constraints we get the following equations 
y^\cOt,*l3PX,\ = E (31) 
^ { a ( , l - a ) X , + b { \ - P ) P X , ]  =  L  (32) 
i{(I - aXl - a ) A-, + (I - d)(l - A I = ^ (33) 
The five equation system (23,24,31-33) can be solved for R, Pe, ,  X, and X^. We will 
now begin to consider explicitly the Rybczynski theorem. 
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3: THE RYBCZYNSKI THEOREM 
There are two main versions of the Rybczynski theorem that we will consider. The 
standard (or strong) version states that if commodity prices are held fixed, an increase in the 
endowment of one factor causes a more than proportionate increase in the output of the 
commodity which uses that factor relatively intensively and an absolute decline in the output 
of the other commodity. A weaker version would imply that the output of the good more 
intensive in that factor would rise relative to that of the other good. For the moment let us 
consider the standard version. 
3.1: The Standard Version of Rybczynski 
Forgetting about magnitudes of output and factor changes, a variant of the standard 
version, which we would call the moderate version, implies that an increase in the endowment 
of a factor should lead to an increase in the output of the good intensive in that factor and a 
decline in the output of the other good, granted that commodity prices are held fixed. This 
moderate version is what we will be mainly concerned with in this section because it is easier 
to characterize since we deal only with signs and not magnitudes of derivatives. If we are able 
to show that this version does not hold under certain scenarios, then we know the standard 
version does not hold under those conditions. However, if the moderate version holds it does 
not imply that the standard version does. 
More formally, the standard version of Rybczynski says that if is more intensive in 
capital, then for an increase in K, 
dX.  ^ K 
—< 0 and > (34^ 
dK dK X, ^ '  
The moderate version says that under the same conditions. 
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dX, dX, 
^<0<^ (35)  
dK dK ^ ^ 
Perhaps a bit crudely we may say that is intensive in K whenever a>b. More 
appropriately X^ is intensive in K whenever (1 - a)(l - a) > (1 - i)(l-p). However, for now 
we consider a versus b rather than (l-a)(l- a) versus (1-Z>)(1-)^. By careful approach 
to solving the equation system we can obtain Pe= Pe{E,K,L,P), R = R{E,K,L,P), 
W=W{E,K,L,P) and alternatively Xj = Xj{E,Pe,W,L,P) or Xj = Xj{E,Pe,R,K,P) or 
dX dX dX 
XJ = XJ{R,K,W,L,P). This way we can more easily sign the terms ——- and —- as 
dX , SK. dR 3X. dw 
^ = / = 1,2 
dE cRdEaVdE 
dX^ dPe dX. dR 
—L = —j = \ 2 
dL dL gR dL 
dE dK dL 
(36) 
(37) 
dX. dPe dW 
— -  =  — 7  =  1 , 2  ( 3 8 )  
d K ^ e d K c W d K ' '  ^  '  
bearing in mind that since the above system is well behaved. 
dPe  ^ dR  ^ ,dW  ^
• < 0, — < 0 and < 0. 
dE '  dK dL 
This latter assertion helps us to sign 
^,F = (Pe,R,W), =iE,K,L) 
dV 
most of which terms we need for (36) through (38). The signs of (36), (37) and (38) form the 
basis for our appraisal of Rybczynski. Let us be more specific. Solving (23) and (24) for 
and R in terms of Pe, we have 
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W = 4„Pe'" and 
where and 7^ are defined as follows: 
^(S)" ( P f i ' f  
k^')  fe) 













.(l-ar) ( l -a )  l -a .  
Substituting (39) and (40) into (31) to (33) we obtain 
^^_4^Pe'"Lr, + ^ ,Pe'''Kr, 
^Y\ 
where y^=(\- a)(l -yS)(a -b), y^- a(l -)S)(1 -h)- P{\ - a)(l - a) and 
y^=ap{\-a)-ab{\-p). 
dF dF 
From (39) through (41) we can obtain — as indicated previously. Applying — to equation 
dX dX dX 
system (36) through (38) we finally obtain the signs of the six derivatives — 
dE dK dL 
j=l,2. More explicitly, fi^om (41) we have 




— and (43) 
dL -Og 
dK -<i>,  ^  ^
-1 J- ~ « D^7*-I 1 where <D^ = rj^^^Pe^'-'Ly^ + Ky^ -Ey, 
dPe 




V d L ,  
sign 
^dPe 
= sign(4^y^) = sign(y^) and 
= = ^ 'gn(r2) VdK 
Note that sign{y^) = sign(a -  b). Thus 7, > 0 implies that good 1 is relatively labor intensive 
and good 2 is relatively capital intensive. On the other hand 7, reflects the capital intensity 
relative to the natural resource intensity of the goods. By definition /, > 0 implies that 
( l -y9) ( l -6)  ( l -a ) ( l -a )  
— > ^ which means that good is relatively capital intensive while 
good 1 is relatively natural resource intensive. Finally y^ reflects labor intensity relative to 
a{\-a) b(\-B) 
capital intensity and > 0 implies that —^— > ——— which means good 1 is relatively 
labor intensive while good 2 is relatively natural resource intensive. 
If y^ <0,  then  >  0  and therefore  
fdPe^ J ^ and 
43 
=sign{-Y^) \aK y 
Thus the above expressions suggest the following. If good 1 is relatively more labor 
than capital intensive >0) and also relatively more labor than natural resource intensive 
then an increase in the labor endowment increases the price of the natural resource input. An 
increase in the capital endowment does the same if good 1 is relatively more resource than 
capital intensive. Similarly, we can derive expressions for the impact of changes in factor 
endowments in the wage rate. 
dW 
dE -d)  ^ (45) 
dW _ 
dK ~ (46) 
dV/ v.W 
*  s  (47) 
dL 
where = 











[dE. = sign(-r,),  and 
sign 
dK> 
= sign{y,).  





dL t  
where <j>^ = Rl. 
l-*?* 
r%i^^w'nw ( r ^  Hm 
4R^r ^4RJ -72^ 




On the other hand if 7^2 < 0, then 
= sign[-y^) and 
sign = signir^) \dL. 
The above results can be summarized briefly with the help of Table 1. When the 
endowment of a factor rises the price of that factor falls. This fall is offset by an increase in 
the composite returns to the other factors. It is possible that the returns to one of the other 
factors might fall, but this must be more than offset by an increase in the return of the third 
factor. Which factor reward rises depends on the rankings of the factor intensities. From the 
above results we conclude that the factor that is intensive in the good that is intensive in the 
reference input (whose stock is increased) will have a higher reward relative to that of the 
third factor. 
Given various parameter configurations we may be able to sign and /j. 
Without specif.c parameter restrictions v/e will be unable to sign these parameters for most 
cases. However, if the parameters (specifically a,,a,6 ) are suitably restricted we can 
Table 1: Impacts of static input stock changes on input prices. 
P. R W 
E < 0  SIGNIYJ.) 
K SIGNIJ.Y^) < 0  SIGRK-Y2R3) 
L SIGNIYJ^) SIGFJI-Y^Y^) < 0  
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dX dX dX 
sign all three expressions. Our final task then is to sign ——- and —From the 
dE dL dK 
above developments we consider various parameter configurations to see if Rybczynski will 
hold as stipulated in the moderate form. As an illustration consider the case where we seek to 
sign and . We use the relation = Xj(E,L,P^,W). 
dK dK 
dX dX dP  ^ 3>C dW . , , 
Thus —- = —7— , J = 1,2. 
dK dK diV dK •' 







Thus J = signir^) (50) 
, 
( 5 1 )  
sigt: dfVj = sign(-y^) and (52) 
SlgtJ = sign(y^) (53) 
Consider the case where cc>/3, b> a. Then if a-j3»b-a>0 we find that T', < 0, 7', > 0 
and  Y2<0.  
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<0< .  Consequent ly  
dK dK 




For b-a» a-p>0 we still have < 0 < . This implies that the Rybczynski theorem 
dX 
holds for this case. However, for the case a>p, a>b —- is ambiguous if 
dK 
a-p » a-b>0 but Rybczynski holds if a - 6 » a - > 0. 
The above analysis was performed also for various other parameter configurations and with 
respect to other factor stocks. The results of this analytical excursion are summarized below 
in five cases. In Case 1 we reproduce the Kemp-Long scenario for comparative purposes. 
CASE 1: a = P, a b. This is the Kemp-Long case. 
(i)a = p, a>b. 
dXi/dL<0<dX2/dL 
dX2/dK<0<dXi/dK 
dX^dE is ambiguous 
CASE 2; a > (3, a > b. 
( i ) a » P ,  a - b ~ 0  
dXi/dL<0<dX2/dL 
(ii) a = p, a < b. 
dXz/dL < 0 < dXi/dL 
dX,/dK<0<dX2/dK 
dX/dH is Hrnbis^wCus 
(ii) a - P ~ 0, a » b 
dXi/dL<0<dX2/dL 
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dX 2/ciE< 0<dXi/dE 
dX/dK is ambiguous 
CASE3:  a>  P,  a<b.  
( i )a»P,  b-a~0 
dX, /dK<0 <d X2/dK 
dX2/dE<0<dXi/dE 
dXi/dL is ambiguous 
CASE 4: a < P, a > b. 
( i ) a « P ,  a - b ~ 0  
dX2/dK<0 <d X i/dK 
dXi/dE<0<dX2/dE 
dXi/dL is ambiguous 
CASE 5; a < P, a < b. 
( i ) a « P ,  b - a ~ 0  
dX2/dL<0 <d X i/dL 
dXi/dE<0<dX2/dE 
dXi/dK is ambiguous 
dX2/dK<0 <dXi/dK 
dXi/dE is ambiguous 
( i i )a -P~0,  b»a  
d Xi/dK<0 < d X2/dK 
dX2/dL<0<dX,/dL 
dX/dE is ambiguous 
( i i )a -P~0,  a»b  
dXi/dL<0 <dX2/dL 
dX2/dK<0<dX,/dK 
dX/dE is ambiguous 
(ii) a - P ~ 0, b » a 
dX2/dL<0 < d X ,/dL 
dXi/dK<0<dX2/dK 
dXi/dE is ambiguous 
We summarize the results follows: 
1. When sign(a-P) = sign(a-b) 
(a) dX/dK is ambiguous if (a-P) »(a-b) and 
49 
(b) dXi/dE is ambiguous if (a-|5)« (a-b). 
2. When sign(a-P) = sign(b-a) 
(a) dXi/dL is ambiguous if (a-P) »(b-a) and 
(b) dXi/dE is ambiguous if (a-P)« (b-a). 
Thus we find that there are regions where Rybczynski holds and regions where the 
result is ambiguous. Ambiguity here is not proof that Rybczynski does not hold. The latter 
can only be ascertained when exact parameter values and factor levels are given. To obtain a 
more comprehensive characterization of the moderate version of Rybczynski we performed 
computer simulations over the parameter space. Fixing and 6 = we varied a, a, and 
the factor stock levels to see where Rybczynski-like results hold and where anti-Rybczynski 
results pertain. The computer simulations were programmed in Maple and the input is 
presented here as Appendix 1. The results of the simulations enable us not only to show that 
the Rybczynski theorem does not hold in some cases but also to obtain the more useful 
information of knowing where in the parameter space it holds and where it does not. 
From the above results we arrive at the following propositions 
Proposition 1: 
(a) When natural resource intensities differ across the two goods, the static version of 
Rybczynski does not necessarily hold. 
(b) Given our technological assumptions, the static version of Rybczynski may not hold for 
(i) a capital stock increase if the good that is intensive in capital is also intensive in the natural 
resource input. 
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(ii) an increase in the labor endowment if the good that is intensive in labor is also intensive in 
the natural resource input. 
(c) Given our assumptions about technology, the possibility of strong static Rybczynski effects 
is dependent on both the factor endowment levels and the parameters of the technology. 
The above conclusions about the Rybczynski theorem are similar to what we observed 
about factor rewards. This is not surprising since by the reciprocity theorem these two 
impacts are essentially similar. We will now turn our attention to the weak (relative) version 
of Rybczynski. Here we will take an alternative approach still within the dual framework, 
which will make the analysis more clear and simple. We are still considering that extension of 
Kemp-Long which involves zero extraction costs but different natural resource intensities. 
3.2: The Weak Version of Rybczynski 
Having obtained somewhat qualitative results for the moderate version of Rybczynski, 
let us turn our attention to the weak version of the theorem. Consider the above model. 
From this point onwards we have reversed the roles of the capital and labor intensities in 
terms of the technology coefficients so that now 
a  e(0,l) ,  b  g(0,1). 




Define i-, / = 1,2 the factor ratios with respect to labor. Furthemiore 
L .  4  
W  W  letfij s — A = — the factor price ratios. 
R  P e  ^  
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Then k^=r^co, k^=r^(o, e, =3/,^ and ^2 =>'2'^ where r, = , /*, = , 
\ - a  \ - b  
« J P V, = and V, = . 
We also have from above, 
where P -  P ^ l  P ^ .  Thus P = / /i, where /n = <3(1 - a)-6(1 -/?). The parameter 
m reflects the difference in total capital intensities between the two goods. Let us define 
=  L j  I L ,  i -  1,2, e - E I L ,  k  =  K I L  and J  =  P— = Then we can write the 
)"2 
resource constraints ^ A — ~ ^ = K.-, and the production relations in 
terms of and the factor price ratios: 
A , + ^ 2 = 1  ( 5 4 )  
A,r, + IjA = kU^^jY" (55) 
+ ^2/2  ~ 
0; = LAj 77ji^ (57) 
0^=LX2T]^h' (58) 
where 
. = 9,f 
. = and 
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Pa{ \ -a ) -c ib( \ -  P )  
m 
Now we are ready to analyze the model with respect to the Rybczynski theorem. Taking total 
derivatives of the above system we have 
+^2^2=0 (59) 
r  (a-/5) 7 1 
=k + - J (60) 
m m 
+3;jA,1, =e-i  (61) 
0, = £ + A, + ^ (62) 
0^=l, + A^+Si (63) 
The above equation system (59) through (63) can be solved for A,, A,, I, 0, and This 
results in the following 
1 _ {p-a)e-mk +  3  
^1 1 (64) X,y /  
^ J-J ^ ' '^h ' 1 _KCi -p) i :^ /nK- j  
^2 ; (65) 
T _  " ' [ ( r .  -Oe- iy^-y , )k ]  +  iy^-y^)J  
o —— (66) y/ 
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' A, ^ \f/ 
^  ^ {a -P)e+mk-J  ^ 5 {m[{r^- r , )e - iy^-y , )k}  +  {y^-y^)3)  
^ X^if/ If/ 
(67) 
(68) 
where ?/= (>'2-;',)(a-y^ + /w(rj-r,). 
Here all the proportional changes bear a static one-time interpretation. Thus e is not to be 
confused with the rate of change over time of e. 
According to the weak (relative) version of Rybczynski, —> 0 if good 2 is 
) 
capital intensive and —< 0 if good 1 is capita! intensive. We observe from above 
that ^2 - = ^2 - A, and thus 
(69) 
XjAj y/ 
Thus holding ^ = J = 0, we want to know what happens O1-O when ^ > 0, that is, when 
there is a one-time increase in k . This is equivalent to a one time increase in K  holding L  
constant or a one time decrease in L holding K constant. 
.^ ^0, -(5,) m d{0 .  -0 , )  .  ,  Now — > = -7-^; . Thus — . ~ > 0 as — >0 smce A, > 0, / = 1,2. 
3c A^A^y/  S i  y /  
Imposing the alternative parameter restrictions implying capital intensity, it is not always true 
that — > 0 for the case where good 2 is capital intensive, or converselv that — < 0 when 
¥ - ' ' y/ 
good 1 is capital intensive. Thus we have arrived at the following conclusions regarding the 




(a) The weak version of Rybczynski holds if and only if sign{m I ij/) = sign(r^ - r,) 
(b) When natural resource intensities differ across the two goods, the weak (relative) version 
of Rybczynski does not hold necessarily. 
(c) Given our assumptions about technology the possibility of relative Rybczynski effects is 
independent of the factor endowment levels, being dependent only on the parameters of the 
technology. 
Proof: 
(a) Follows from above. 
(b) Figures 3.1 through 3.3 provide illustrations of the regions in parameter space over which 
the theorem holds and those regions over which it does not. 
(c) This is clear as the condition for the theorem to hold as outlined in (a) involves only 
parameters and not factor endowment levels. 
V /m 
100 
z i [ 2 ]  5 0  -
-Ot2- 0 . 4  
a l p  lia 
• 5 0 -
Rybczynski holds 
- 1 0 0  -
Figure 3.1: Rybczynski and Anti-rybczynsi regions 
Rybczynski does 
not hold 
0 . 6  0 . 8  v/i 
/m  
1 0 0 -
z i [ 2 1  5 0 -
0 . 2  0 . 4  
Rybczynski holds 
- 5 0 - -
-100-^ 
Figure: 3.2: Rybczynski and Anti-rybczynsi regions 
Rybczynski does 
not hold 




400- Rybczynski holds throughout 
300 
2 0 0 -
1 0 0 -
alpha 
Figure 3.3; Rybczynski and Anti-rybczynsi regions 
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4: THE STOLPER-SAMUELSON THEOREM 
We will consider two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. The strong version 
says that an increase in the relative price of a given commodity will lead to an increase in the 
real return of the factor that is used intensively in producing that commodity and a decline in 
the real return of the other factor. The weak version of this theorem would imply that an 
increase in the relative price of a given commodity will lead to an increase in the real return of 
the factor that is used intensively in that commodity relative to that of the other factor. 
Thus we need to go back to where the wage-rental ratio is related to the output price ratio. 
There we find that J = which implies that co = [Jh^" Taking total derivatives we 
have 
.  J+{P-a)h  
a = — (70) 
m  
Substituting for i from (66) and setting e = ^ = 0, we have 
^_ W+{p-a) {y2  -y , ) }3  
mil/ 
4.1: The Standard Version of Stolper-Samuelson 
d(b 
The moderate version of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem requires that —> 1 when 
good 1 is intensive in capital and —r < -1 when good 2 is capital intensive. Thus, from above 
aJ 
the moderate version holds if 
\V+ip-a){y2 -.yi)l>IV^i and 
sigri{iif+{p- a)(y2 ->'i) }  =  s i g n {  y m )  when good 1 is capital intensive 
sign{ \}/+ (fi- a){y^^ - >'i)} = -sign{ ym} when good 2 is capital intensive 
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Recall that Y={y2-y\){cc-p)-^ - fx) which implies that 
i f f + i f i - a ) i y 2  - > ' , )  =  m i r ^  - / • , ) •  
Therefore for the theorem to hold we must have Ir^ -r,l>lv'| and sign{r^ -r^) = sign{\f/) 
when good 1 is capital intensive and sign(r2 -r^) = -sign{ y/) when good 2 is capital 
intensive. Recalling the definitions of = 1,2, we see that neither of these necessarily 
holds. We summarize the above in the following proposition. 
Proposition 3: 
a: The moderate version of Stolper-Samuelson holds if and only if |r, - r, 1>| and 
(i) signir^ ~ ''i) = ¥) when good 1 is capital intensive or 
(ii) signir^ -r^) = -sign{ y/) when good 2 is capital intensive. 
b: When the two goods are different in their natural resource intensities the standard 
(moderate) version of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem does not hold necessarily. 
4.2: The Weak Version of Stolper-Samuelson 
The weak version requires that > 0 <=> s i g n ( r ^  ~ f ] )  =  s ' g f K  y ^ )  when good 1 is 
^0) 
capital intensive and —< 0 <=> sign{r^ ~f\) = ¥) when good 2 is capital intensive. 
<2/ 
This in turn implies that y / < Q \ n  both cases. Thus we arrive at the following. 
Proposition 4a; 
Weak Stolper-Samuelson holds if and only if ^ < 0. 
Simulation results show that for all parameter values ^^<0, as exemplified in Figure 4.1 
which displays a plot of y/ against a for given values of the other parameters. Thus we can 
say the following. 
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Proposition 4b: 
The weak version of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem holds even when natural resource 
intensities differ across the two goods. 
y/  y /=y^x +  Wi  
- 1 .  5 - -
-2 -
- 2 . 5 -




5: THE GENERALIZED H-0 MODEL WITH EXTRACTION COSTS 
In the previous section we extended the generalized H-0 model by allowing for 
different natural resource intensities across the two goods. In this section we shall revert back 
to the case where the natural resource intensities are the same but extend the model by 
allowing for positive marginal costs of extracting the natural resource input. We shall assume 
that the natural resource input is extracted with the use of positive amounts of labor and 
capital. Specifically, the description for our technology becomes 
X .  =  Z , , a n d  
A', = as in Kemp-Long. But now we also have 
E  =  g { K ^ , L ^ )  =  Maintaining our dual approach, the cost functions are 
respectively: 
C, = (72) 
C = and (73) 
Cj = (74) 
o. b y 
Mrnoro Ir — y—- >• — . y — - ^ I /v^  — t  — 1^1  '  2~ i  L '  3~1  '  
/ = = and y-, and co and h are as defined previously. ( l-a)(l-a) - ( l-6)(l-a) 
J = — P = co" where now /n = (1 - a)(a - b) and P= P^ / P, dis previously defined. 
M2 
Define (75) 
the net shadow price of the natural resource input. Thus 
^  - r ,  ,  y + M-,0} n = \. (76) 
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Expressing as before the factor constraints and technology relations in terms of the 
factor prices and parameters, we obtain the following system of equations: 
A,+A,+A3 = 1 (77) 
M + ^ 2^2 + ^3^3 = (78) 
Vl +>^2^2 (79) 
!• + ,., A/-"- = (80) 
• 'e 
= e where 73 = Tj'' (81) 
Q^^LX,T],h' '  (82) 
0^=LX.Ti^h'' (83) 
Taking total derivatives as before we get 
+ A, + AjAj = 0 (84) 
J 
r,2,A, +r^2,A, = k (85) 
m 
>',2, A, = e-i (86) 
d - P , - - J  =  e  (87) 
m 
^, = Z + Ij + ai (88) 
Oj — L, + •!" (89) 
We can solve for 1,, /" = 1,2,3, 1,0^,0^^ and as 
^ fn tn 
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) + (r, -r^)?.^{e + ^ J) 
^2 = —^-^-7 —— (91) 
^l iT i  - rx )  
-rd + ^yx ->'2)(^--)-'^3(>'l ->'2 +''3)(e + --/) 
OT m 
' • i - rx  
(92) 
(^--^ + e)(r,  -r ,)  + (j ' ,->'2)(^--)-A3(;; ,  -J 'z+r3)(e + -J) 
w m L (93) 
^2 -^, 
J 
A, (£ + Qis)(r, - r,) + (^ —XaCy, -><2) A, -1] - A, (^ + -^ J)[a;i, {y, ->', + ) + (r^ - rj)] 
^ ^ ^  ( 9 4 )  
A,(r, -r,) 
(Z + a?)(rj - r,) + (^ - -)[a(y, - )/l, +1] - A3 (^ + - J)[aA, (y, - :V2 + /"j) - (n - /"j)] 
a = ^ 77 ^^ (95) 
/l,(r, -r,) 
Given the foregoing we are ready to arrive at some conclusions regarding the 
RybczjTiski and Stolper-Samuelson theorems. 
5.1: The Standard Version ofRybczynski 
From above. 
a(V. -  v. \Z .  - \  
^' and (96) 
^ A.J (r, - r,) 
^2 ^ ->'2)^2 +1 
-^2 ('2 ~ ''i) 
(97) 
We note that 
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a C r ^ - r , )  a { b - a )  _  
y2-yx= -yzrx = , ,  '  = , , ,  r- Thus (1-a) (l-a)(l-6)(l-a) 
SO, ^g^^(r,-r,)/0-g)-l  
d Mf2-n)  
Similarly, 
a- 1 
1 - a  
(98) 
^2 1 Q;" 
 (99) 
i ,(r ,-r ,)  (l-a) 
Suppose good 2 is capital intensive. Then r, > r, and we have —=^ < 0 as needed for 
Rybczynski. However, —appears ambiguous from the above expression. In the same vein, 
for good 1 being capital intensive, r, < r, implying that < 0 as required, but now— 
^ dc 
appears ambiguous. 
However, this ambiguity in both cases is only apparent. Consider a one time increase 
in k. Given that the factor constraints hold exactly suppose the increase in k is not applied to 
X, or production. Then it must be used for E. In that case, however, the resulting 
increase in e means that e to be used in X, or X, since the natural resource input is assumed 
to be nontraded. This contradicts our earlier assertion that the increase in k is not applied to 
either or X^. Granted now that an increase in k is used to produce at least one of X, or 
X,, —< 0 established implies that > 0 when good 2 is capital intensive. Similarly 
dC) sC) 
for good 1 being capital intensive, < 0 => -=^ > 0. Thus we conclude that the moderate 
version of the Rybczynski theorem holds. 
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Proposition 5: 
When the natural resource intensities are the same across the two goods, the Rybczynski 
theorem holds in the absence of trade in the natural resource input even when there are 
positive marginal costs of extraction. 
This proposition implies that the weak version of Rybczynski holds as well in this case. This 
is easier to establish since we have 
( i f - - ) ( l - ; i3 )  +  l3 (e  +  ^ J ) (AJ- '"" - r , )  
ttt 000) 
1-^ ^ 0 as good 2 
and hence — = —— „ , , is capital mtensive. 
a:  -/- ,)< 0 as good 1 ^ 
5.2; r/ie Stolper-Samuelson Theorem 
Establishing the Stolper-Samuelson theorem is more obvious since from above, 
.J J — of which implies that d) = —. Now signt^m) = sign{a - b). Furthermore j.'T'ie (0,1) and 
m 
hence we conclude the following; 
Proposition 6; 
When natural resource intensities are the same across the two goods, the strong version of 
Stolper-Samuelson holds regardless of extraction costs of the Cobb-Douglas form. 
Proposition 6 implies that the weaker versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theory hold as well. 
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6: CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have investigated the implications for standard static trade theorems 
of allowing for different natural resource intensities in the framework of the Kemp-Long 
generalized H-0 model. We found that the Rybczynski and Stolper-Samuelson theorems no 
longer hold in general. Various versions of the theorems were considered - strong and weak 
versions - and the conditions under which these hold were analyzed. 
The above conclusions held in the absence of extraction costs. It was found that when 
positive extraction costs were allowed for, but reverting back to the equal natural resource 
intensities assumption of Kemp-Long, the standard static trade theorems were upheld. Thus 
the issue of more importance here was that of factor intensity rather than extraction 
technology. A necessary caveat though, is that our extraction technology was restricted to be 
of Cobb-Douglas constant returns form so that the results might not be generalizable to other 
forms of extraction technology. 
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PAPER 2: 
DYNAMIC ISSUES IN 




Various alternative models have been used to incorporate natural resources into trade 
models. Kemp and Lxjng (1984) surveyed the existing literature and provided a summary of these 
models. On the opposite extreme from the standard H-0 firework is the class of Anti H-0 
models in which the two Ricardian (primary) inputs of the traditional H-0 model are replaced by 
two raw materials obtained from a natural resource stock. Thus two final goods are produced 
nonjointly by two Hotelling factors using a constant returns to scale technology. Hybrid models 
are those in which one of the two inputs is Ricardian and the other is Hotelling. Generalized 
models have at least one of each type of input. In Generalized H-O models there are two Ricardian 
factors and at least one Hotelling factor, possibly many. Generalized anti H-0 models have two 
Hotelling factors and at least one Ricardian factor. While all these models could to various 
extents, be employed for useful analysis, most of the works in the literature have used the anti H-0, 
hybrid, and generalized H-0 models (hereafter GHOM)-
The anti H-0 model allows one to investigate static and dynamic issues in a two sector 
trade model when the only inputs are two different raw materials obtained from a natural resource 
stock. Except in singular cases the two goods will differ in their respective intensities in the two 
inputs. Thus the economic implications appear much the same as in the traditional H-0 perspective 
except that the usual static analysis is now appended by dynamic considerations. 
The hybrid model provides a dimension of analysis not included in the anti H-0 model. 
With the former, the opportunity is presented for us to analyze trade and production issues in a 
situation where one of the inputs is obtained from a stock of endowment that is fixed over time 
while the other is obtained from a stock that varies (usually falls) over time. 
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The GHOM is a further improvement over the anti H-0 and hybrid models for most 
purposes. By simply appending a hotelling factor to the traditional H-O model, the GHOM allows 
us to analyze the static issues of the traditional H-0 model more fiilly than does the hybrid model: 
we can consider issues pertaining to different factor intensities when two factors are Ricardian. 
Since the third factor is hotelling we are able to consider the dynamic issues that the hybrid models 
also pemiit. In short, the GHOM more completely embodies the technolo^cal possibilities that 
might be of interest to us. As such we have chosen, in this paper as well as in others, to provide 
useful extensions to the GHOM of Kemp and Long (1984) as our contribution to the existing body 
of literature. 
Naturally, dealing with more than two factors of production means that the usual 
propositions which are formulated in terms of relative factor intensities and relative factor 
abundance are expected to be much more complicated. Thus work on the GHOM has proceeded 
by imposing a suitably restrictive structure on the production technologies. Proceeding in this 
fashion Kemp and Long (1980, 1984) established dynamic counterparts of all the major trade 
theorems (Heckscher-Ohlin, Stolper-Samuelson, Rybczynski and Factor Price Equalization). In 
particular, they assumed a production function of the form 
X. = X^iE.,L^,K^) = E;0^iL^,K^y-' '  j  = 1,2. (1) 
so that the natural resource intensities are restricted to be the same across the two goods. 
As our first extension of the GHOM we relax this assumption by allowing for different 
natural resource intensities. Our task then will be to characterize some useflil propositions 
concerning production patterns and trade. Another promment assumption of the work of Kemp 
and Long with the GHOM is that of costlessness of extraction. In the second extension we will 
allow for positive marginal costs of extraction but revert to the assumption of equal natural 
resource intensities. The final extension will be a combination of the first two; we will consider the 
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Kemp-Long GHOM with different natural resource intensities and positive mar^al extraction 
costs. 
At this stage it wll be helpful to spell out the basic assumptions that we use throughout the 
paper. 
1.2: Basic Assumptions 
1.2.1: Production Structure 
The most obvious assumption underlying this paper is that of functional structure. We will 
follow Kemp-Long (1984) in using the Cobb-Douglas structure freely in all sections of this paper. 
Each good, Xj, is produced with a natural resource input, Ej and an intermediate good Oj. Oj is 
in turn produced using labor Lj and capital Kj. In the Kemp-Long study no specific structure was 
specified for Oj (Lj ,Kj). However, for expositional ease we will use the Cobb-Douglas structure 
again for Qj(Lj ,Kj). This resuhs in just a slight loss of generality but it pays off with significant 
ease of analysis. Our final use of the Cobb-Douglas stmcture is in the specification of the 
extraction technology' in sections I! and HI where we assume positive marginal extraction costs. A 
modest defense of the use of the Cobb-Douglas production functions in such analysis has been 
provided in Kemp and Long (1980). Each production flinction exhibits strict quasi-concavity and 
constant returns to scale. There is no capital investment and the natural resource stock is assumed 
to be exhaustible. 
1.2.2: Price and Market Structure 
Competitive market conditions prevail, as also assumed in the standard H-0 model. 
Furthermore, we shall assume that final good prices are exogenously given and constant. The case 
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of time contingent prices has been investigated by Kemp and Long (1982) in the framework of the 
hybrid model. 
1.2.3: Borrowing and Lending Possibilities 
Throughout this paper we shall assume that perfect borrowing and lending conditions 
prevail in international capital markets. This implies that the maximization of the discounted stream 
of output is necessary for the maximization of discounted utility (Segerson, 1988). 
In addition to the above we maintain the H-0 assumption of identical preferences within a country 
and across countries. 
Having outlined the basic assumptions a word about our method of approach is usefLil. 
1.3: Methodology 
We have chosen, throughout this paper to use a dual approach in our analysis. This 
approach appears much easier and more insightful. Furthermore, the analysis is flirther simplified 
by splitting the entire optimization problem into three phases; 
Phase 1 A; Static optimization over labor and capital inputs to produce the imermediate goods, 
and O2. 
Phase IB; Static optimization over the natural resource input, E to produce the two final goods, 
Jr, and Z,. 
Phase 2; Dynamic optimization to choose the path of natural resource extraction, E(t), that 
maxin^es the discounted present value of income. 
In this paper we shall dwell on dynamic issues. Static issues have been addressed in another paper. 
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2: THE GHOM WITH DIFFERENT RESOURCE INTENSITIES AND ZERO 
EXTRACTION COSTS 
As mentioned earlier in the section on methodology, we start with intermediate good 
production and then proceed to consider final good production. 
2.1: Intermediate Good Production 
It will be useful to see the production of the two final goods as composed of two phases of 
production. First, the production of the intermediate goods using the primary factors and secondly 
the utili2ation of the intermediate goods in final good production. Let the production function for 
the intermediate goods be written as 
o,  =  L;^K; -^^i= \x  (2) 
Let W and R be the respective wage and capital rental rates, and let and 5, be the surrogate 
prices of 0, and . The cost fiinction dual to this production structure has a familiar form; 
TC^ = j=l,2 (3) 
where 6j = (1 - Qjj . 
By the H-0 assumption of perfect competition 
ffrc 
S, < j=l,2 (4) 
with equality when Oj > 0 j=l,2. Thus as long as both intermediate goods are produced (4) 
represents a system of two simultaneous equations which can be solved to yield the factor price 
levels as functions of the intermediate good prices; 
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W = and (5) 
R = 
I 
r  (5 ,  /e ,Y '  r"*"  
L f e ' « , r j  •  





5, Define p= —, the ratio of intermediate good prices. Then 





Thus at the level of intermediate good production the relationship between primary factor 
prices and the intermediate good price ratio obeys the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Applying 





The returns to the labor and capital inputs are constant shares of the value of intermediate good 
and these shares sum up to 1 as one would expect from the assumption of constant returns to scale. 
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The factor constraints, ^ L j  = L ,  and ^ K j = K  become 
AQ =B (10) 
where 0 «2)'^2 
*2*^2 
and B = [rk ' IWL, 
Inverting the equation system (10) we can solve for the output vector as O = A B, which gives us 
0,=2a«£dlz£l)51 and 
(a,-a,)S, (11) 
_ ( \ - a , ) W L - a , R K  
(a,-a,)5. (12) 
By defining k = KI L we can rewrite (11) and (12) in terms of factor endowment and factor price 
ratios; 
Q^ = RL[{\ - a^)o}- a^k] (14) 
We are now ready to investigate the rules governing intermediate good production. This 
will imply patterns of final good production since by our technology each input is essential in the 
production process. By some manipulation of (13) and (14) we can derive the set of parameters 
for which there is specialization in one intermediate good or diversification. The conditions for 
both goods to be produced is g^ven under alternative parameter scenarios as 
77 
0) Q, > 0, 02 > 0=>— e a, 
.1-a,  '1-a,  
when <ar, > a,, and (15) 
0) Q >0, 02 >0=>—e a, 
,1-a, '1-a 
when a, >a,. (16) 
We have thus obtained that the cone of diversification expressed in terms of y is the 
f \ f 
interval min 
a, 
vl-a, '1-a, .max 
a, a, 
, — —  .  B y  t h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  O) and p in (7) we 
J-a, l -a^JJ 
can alternatively express the cone of diversification in terms of p. This is substantially simpler and 
more useful, for 










/ ' io\ 
and it is clear that p^ < whenever a, a,. A graphical illustration of this is provided in Figure 
2.1. As the cone of (^versification is now defined by the interval (p^ ), we can write more fiilly 
the set of values of p that pertain to various modes of specialization as follows: 
0, > 0, O2 = 0 when p<Pi : Only intermediate good 1 produced: Re^on I 
Qi > 0, Oj > 0 when p e ): Both intermediate goods produced: Region n (20) 
Qi = 0, Q2 > 0 when p> p^ : Only intermediate good 2 produced: Re^on HI 
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Given our assumptions it is clear that and Py are functions only of exogenously 
given constants. Thus the cone of diversification remains fixed over time. The opportunities 
for changes in production and trade over time thus rest on the behavior of p(/) over time. To 
investigate the time path of p we need to close the model by introducing static optimization 
over E and the dynamic optimization phase. To facilitate comparison we will present first a 
brief summary of the dual approach to the Kemp-Long model. 
Specialize 





in good 2 
a Q 
Figure 2.1 Intermediate good production in the GHOM. 
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2.2; Final Good Production In The Kemp-Long Model 
In the work of Kemp and Long (1984) the final goods are written as 
X. =E;Q;-''ri,2. (21) 
Let Pj be the price of good j and Pe the price of the natural resource input. Then the dual cost 
function for good j is 
TCj = (^jP/S/-" (22) 
where ^ = [a" (1 - a)'"" ] '. Thus by the assumption of perfect competition 
^rc 
P^<^=4Pe'^S;-'' j=l,2 (23) 
with equality when > 0. Thus if both goods are produced, we have that 
S ^ P^ 
Pe \.<j>Pej 
Also by Shepherd's lemma. 
(24) 
O i. fn'^\ 
•^j — v o ^ ' 
aX, aS.O. 
and£,=—'- = (26) 
' Pe {\-a)Pe ^ ^ 
Therefore applying the constrmnt on natural resource extraction at a point in time we have 
(xS,0, (xS-,Q-t S, I \ 
^ "  (l-a)Pe (l-a)Pe " (l-a)Pe^ 
5", Since P = -^, (24) allows us to express the intermediate goods price ratio in terms of P^ 
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a constant (28) 
As from (28) p is constant over time, the above analysis leads us to the foUowng conclusion. 
Lemma (Kemp-Long (1984) lemma 3.1): 
The competitive allocation of Ricardian factors is independent of the rate of natural resource 
extraction. 
^, = 0, ^2 > 0 when p>p^j \ Only final good 2 produced: Re^on HI 
Again, as p, p^ and p^j are all fixed, (29) implies the following: 
Proposition 1: 
When the natural resource intensities are equal across the two goods (a, =«, = «) and extraction 
is costless as in the Kemp-Long case, only two production patterns are possible: Either 
(a) Only one and the same good is produced all the time or 
(b) Both goods are produced all the time. 
This is illustrated in Figure 2.2. In this case there is no change in production patterns over 
time. Suppose that the prevailing parameters suggest that both goods be produced. Then the 
theorems pertaining to static production patterns in the static trade model would hold here as well. 
From (25) > 0 => Ej > 0 and = 0 => = 0 j=l,2. Thus 
andO^ =0=>^, =0j=l,2. 
Hence by (20) we conclude that 
X, > 0, when p < : Only final good 1 produced: Regjon I 




unaltered. In addition to production patterns an issue of interest is the rate of natural resource 
extraction. Substituting for O, and (27) and simplifying we have 
E = aLR{k + CO) 
(1- a)Pe 
However, from (6) we can substitute for R so that E can be expressed in terms of Pe alone. 
(30) 
E = E{Pe) = ocL{k-vcD)\(SJ9X^-\' 
(l-a)/>.L(5^/0j'j 
cd.{k+o)) 
{\-a)Pe L 5,"' J 





aL{k + CO) y/^ 
(l-a)Pe""-''> (31) 
where = ¥i = ¥, 
(pj*)" 









Figure 2.2: Production patterns in the Kemp-Long model. 
- -Pe E = - (32) 
1-a 
where for any expression y, we adopt throughout this paper the notational definition y = 
y 
dy 
and y = —. To obtain Pe we need to solve the final problem which is the optimal control 
dt 
problem; 
max Jexp(-rr)F(£, P,, Pj, L, K)dt (33) 
^ 0 
j -r 
s.t. N{t)  = -£(f), ]Eit )dt  = N = N{Q) > 0 
0 
where K(-) is maximized income from the intratemporal optimization, N(t) is the level of the 
natural resource stock at time t, and N is the initial value of N. It is a well known result that the 
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solution to this dynamic problem implies that the net shadow price of the resource rises at the rate 
of interest. In the absence of extraction costs the net shadow price is equal to Pe. Thus, simply. 
It follows then that 
which was Lemma 3.2 of Kemp-Long. The rate of resource extraction is constant over time, E 
declining at a rate faster than the rate of interest. Thus Kemp and Long established dynamic 
counterparts of the four standard trade theorems. In the following section our first extension of the 
Kemp-Long model is presented. We will allow for different natural resource intensities while 
maintaining the assumption of costlessness of extraction. 
2.3: Final Good Production With Different Resource Intensities 
We introduce different natural resource intensities by allowing a, and to differ so that 
now instead of (21) we have 
Pe = r (34) 
x.=E;^o;-''\i = \x (36) 
As our dual cost functions we now have 
TC^ = (37) 
where (f)j = [(1 - )'"•' ] . Thus 
p. = 
when both goods are produced and hence 
(38) 
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5, f P, y'"; 
Pe [<j>^Pe] • 
The interaiediate good and natural resource input allocations are by Shephard's lemma. 
J 
a Jf cCjSjOj 
andE.=——- = —' ' ' . (41) 
' Pe {\-aj)Pe ^ ' 
The above allows us to express the level of natural resource extraction in terms of the intermediate 
good levels and prices and the natural resource price. 
^ ' {\-a,)Pe (l-a,)Pe Pe\\-a, 1-a, J" ^ ^ 
As mentioned above the cone of diversification is fixed over time. Thus to investigate production 
patterns we derive the path of p(t). By definition. 
« i 
5, SJPe [PJ<f,^Pef^- _ n =  — =  — =  =  =  =  =  ^ "
S, SJ Pe -±- f \—" 
,  r ,  a,-a, 
where J = j— and/?7 = = . 
The path of the intermediate good price ratio is related to the path of the price of the natural 
resource and is also influenced by final good prices through J which acts as a scaling factor. Thus, 
unlike the Kemp-Long model the intermediate price ratio is no longer constant over time. Note 
that the production rule (29) holds here as well. Taking logarithmic derivatives of (43) we have 
p=J+mPe (44) 
But by assumption J = 0. Therefore 
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p=mPe. (45) 
Equation (45) provides some useful characterization; 
Lemma 1: 
When natural resource intensities differ, the ratio of intermediate good prices, p, varies 
J directly 1 {m>0o a^> aA 
i. , f with Pe over time as i „ r [inverselyJ < 0o a, < a,J 
By similar reasoning as above a dual approach to our optimal control problem establishes 
that Pe = r . This implies that 
p = mr (46) 
Thus we can establish a more specific characterization about p{t) than in lemma 1. 
Lemma 2: 
In the absence of extraction costs, when the natural resource intensities differ, the ratio of 
intermediate good prices, 
Jme5l f/n > 0 o a, > a, 
f over time as i . {falls] [tw < 0 <» a, < a. 
Thus by our variable definitions we can conclude the following; 
Proposition 2; 
Under the conditions of this model (specified in lemma 2), the price of the intermediate good used 
in producing the more (less) resource intensive final good falls (rises) over time relative to the price 
of the other intermediate good. 
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Now we are ready to investigate the nature of production patterns in this model. Since in 
contrast to Kemp-Long, p is no longer constant over time, application of the rule in (29) leads us 
to a conclusion regarding production patterns that is markedly different from that of Kemp-Long 
(1984). Specifically, when different natural resource intensities are allowed in the GHOM, 
production patterns could potentially go through three different stages: an initial stage in which 
only one good is produced, a middle stage of changing shades of diversification during which both 
goods are produced and a fiinal stage in which there is specialization in the good which was not 
produced during the initial stage. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the two possible cases of production patterns over time. Which of the 
two goods is produced at any stage depends on which one is more natural resource intensive. 
Nonetheless, we can infer from Proposition 2 that in the region that occurs first, the more natural 
resource intensive good is produced. Thus we can say the following; 
Given the specifications of our model, there east potentially three stages of production: During 
the initial stage if it occurs, there is specialization in the more natural resource intensive good. This 
is followed by a second potential stage during which various shades of diversification occur. The 
final stage will entail specialization in the good that is less natural resource intensive. 
It is important to emphasize that the three-stage scenario of production pattems is only a 
potential occurrence. Gven the initial conditions of the system with a, > a,, it is possible that 
P<Pl never happen in which case Stage I will not occur. Similarly if p{Q) > p^ then there is 
specialization in the good that is less natural resource intensive for all time. 
In order to obtain a more specific characterization of production pattems we need to solve the 
isoperimetric constraint. We will come to this issue later. Before then, we would like to 
characterize the behavior of factor prices and the resource extraction profile. Totally differentiating 





Figure 2.3: Production patterns in the GHOM with different resource intensities. 
o5 = ^. (47) 
Equation (47) establishes the behavior of the wage-rental ratio over time. 
Lemma 3: 
Under the conditions specified in this model, the wage-rental ratio rises (falls) over time if the 
good that is natural resource intensive is also capital (labor) intensive. 
This suggests that a modified version of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem which would 
hold in this djmamic context takes into account two effects: 
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(a) the effect of a relative change in final good price, which is also considered in the static version 
and the dynamic version analyzed by Kemp-Long, and 
(b) the dynamic efifect of the rising level of the natural resource price. 
Also of particular interest in the natural resource trade literature is the rate of natural 
resource extraction. From (25) we can rewrite E as 
E = 
{\-a,)Pe Q\ + 
g,(I-gi) 
a,(l-a,) pQi (48) 
By an envelope theorem we know that 
We also obtain by total differentiation of (39) that 
(49) 
Furthermore, define 
Pej= 1,2. (50) 
P . A J =1,2, (51) 
^ dp X. 
the elasticity of the jth intermediate good with respect to the intermediate good price ratio, p, 
defined above. Then using (45), (49) and (50) we obtain upon total differentiation of (48): 
£(/) = - Pe (!-«,) + 
mPe pOj a,( l-«i)  .  («i  -<^2) 
.a ,0-a,)  ^a,( l-a ,) .  
Q\ + PQi 







Q\-^ pQt C^20•-C^^) 
.CjO-a^). 
i. 
Let us denote the expression in braces by /t: so that 
E { t )  =  - K P e i t ) .  (53) 
/tO  
By writing h = and by further simplifications we can rewrite ac in a more usefiil form; 
Qi 
1 ^ "zO-ai) 
" + b 
K = -\ 1-a, a,(l-a2) 
1 f,(a,-a,) 
—- + • 
.1-a, a2(l-a,) (1-a,). 




Since > 0 we can show that K >  1 
l-min(ai,a,) > 1 for every finite h. Furthermore it 
1 olcr* /v i-T c (ry /v\>>/v/'l /v\ ^irV»<ar» V* 4 ^ *^-y \ ^ *^*7 J V * ] / ' ikAkWA AAAkA V WiJT ^ W AAWiA 
1-a, 
1 
a, >a,, «•> if £,(a,-a,)>a,(l-a,). Thus we have that K  is bounded below by 
1-a, 
[l-min(a,,a,)]"' .  It can also be shown by some manipulation that K is bounded above if 
max(ff,, £,) is finite. Recall that in the Kemp-Long case, k = 1 1 1 
1-a, 1-a, 1-a 
Suppose 
thai in the K-L case, a=a, ; then £, = -P^/(1-a,) and for a=a^\ then 
£ = -.P^/(l-a,). Thus one would think that for a, a,, 
E 6 (min(-.P^ /(l-a,),-P^ /(l-ci:,)),max(-.P^ /(l-a,),-P^ / (1-a,))) . 




When the natural resource intensities differ across the two goods, the rate of natural resource 
extraction is faster than that implied by the good with the lower resource intensity but it need not 
be slower than that implied by the good with higher resource intensity. It could be faster than both. 
This unexplained asymmetry means that the rate of natural resource extraction in this case 
does not necessarily lie within the bounds implied by the two resource intensities even though this 
might be what our intuition would suggest. 
Corollary 3.1: 
The rate of natural resource extraction is not an exogenously given constant. It is a funaion of the 
ratio of the values of the intermediate goods (i)) and of the relative price elasticity of the 
intermediate goods. 
We can similarly obtain an expression for the level of resource extraction, E{t) as a 
function of time and exogenous constants orJy. We start by substituting for O, and into (48) 
and upon simplification we have 
£ ^  a,RL{X,k + ^ ^co) 
(l-a,)(a,-a,)Pe 
where A, = ^2giO-Q:2)-^iQ^20-Q^i) ^ (l-q,)g.(l-g,)-(l-a.)gi(l-g.) 
Substituting for R and o) and bearing in mind that Pe = r -we obtain finally 
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cc 
E{t) = ^kPeiOy^ exp(Ti,rO + ^ zPeCO)'^^ expCri^rr) 
U ^ \ )  
(56) 
, ma, 1 m{\-a,) 1 
where Ti, = ^ ' ^2 = = T1,+- m 
a^-^i 1-ct, 






r , = '—, and jij = • V "2/' 
a^-a, Oi-a, 
Totally differentiating (56) we obtain an alternative expression for E which is useful for 
comparing with the other extensions in this paper: 
E=\—^ ^-^2 
equation (106) 
Applying the isoperimetric constraint 
r where vi;,,vj;2, ^o jij are defined in the general case following 
l£:(0^^/ = A^ = ^(0)>0 (57) 
one gets 
-rr -<X LT J XkPejOf' ^ ^2-^^(0)"' 
It is not possible to solve (58) explicitly for a closed-form expression for Pe(0). However, 
one can simulate the above expression to obtain the locus of Pe(0) over the parameter space. The 
value of P,(0) for any given parameter realization can be used to infer production patterns as 
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follows. We know from above that at any time t, only good 1 is produced if /?(/) < both if 
p{t) e and only good 2 if pit)> p^. Since p{t) = JPei^y tx'pimrt) we have 
p{0) = JPeiOy and piT) = JPe(0)"' exp{mrT). Assume without loss of generality that m>0. 
Then p(t) rises over time. If p(0) < p^ and p{T)> p^ then by continuity of p(/) all three 
stages occur. In terms of the initial price of the natural resource 
P(0)<Pi =>^e(0)<" a.k J ' T J J 
Mm 
= P and 





So all three stages occur if P^^ < P^(0) < P^^. Furthermore define 
ajc f ^2 1 
Ll-a,. ^9jJ exTp{mrT)^ 
l /m 
' and 
p:  = 
1 1 Mm 
It is clear that < P^^ < and that < P^^ < PJ^. Also for some general parameter values, 
< P^^ < P^^ < -^4 • ^ following proposition. 
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Proposition 4: 
Under suitable parameter scenarios in the GHOM with different natural resource intensities, 
alternative production patterns result depending on the initial level of the natural resource price as 
follows: 
(a) If P,(0) < there will be specialization in the natural resource intensive good 
(b) If P,(0) 6 ) there will be specialization in the natural resource intensive good followed 
by diversification. 
(c) If P^(0) e there will be specialization in the natural resource intensive good initially, 
followed by a period of diversification and finally specialization in the other good. 
(d) If P^(0) s (P^^,PJ^) there will be diversification initially followed by specialization in the 
natural resource unintensive good. 
(e) If P,(0) > PJ^ there will be specialization in the natural resource unintensive good. 
Proof 
Recall that without loss of generality, good 1 is relatively natural resource intensive. 
P few P' c" T\ n TViic nnUr rorrtr^n \ r^\^/  ^ A-'v / ^ r^L' 
(b) P^(0) € (P/. ,Pe^) o piT) py) and p{0) < p^. Thus regions 1 and then 2 occur. 
(c) P^(0) e (P^^,P^^.) o p(0) < and p{T)> p^. So we have regions 1 then 2 and then 3. 
(d) P^(0) s{P^^,Pj^)o p(0) g(p^,P jj)  and p{T)> p^. Thisgves us regions 2 and then 3. 
(e) P^(0) > PJ^  o p(T)> p(0) > Pu. Only region 3 occurs. 
The above model can be simulated to infer production patterns over various parameter 
realizations. Simulation results have not been reported in this paper. The locus of Pe(0) implies 
also a locus for p(0) = JPeiJS)'" over the parameter space. We can also derive an analytical 
expression for the period of diversification that does not depend on the solution value of Pe(0) but 
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rather depends on p^j Ip^, the ratio of the limits of the cone of diversification. Let a superscript 
denote the solution values based on (58) so that Pe(0)* is the value of Pe(0) that solves (58). 
Then p(0)* = JPe(Qi)*'" or p{t)* = JPe{0)''" exp(/wrt). Assume without loss of generality that 
a, > • Suppose fiirther that all stages occur. In that case /, is the time of transition fi-om Stage 
I to Stage n, where r, solves 
Pj^ = JPeiO)'" exp(/nr/i). (59) 
Similarly, is the time of transition fi-om Stage II to Stage HI, where /, solves 
Py = JPeiO)*" exp {mrt^_). (60) 
Solving (59) and (60) for /, and U respectively we obtain 
t  =—In 
mr 
PL 
\JPeiSS)'" and (61) 




Thus it is clear that for a, >a^m>0 and since p^ > we will have < /,. 
Subtractine Coi") from (62) we have the period of diversification to be 
(62) 




The results of this section, in particular Corollary 3.1, imply that a country that is capital 
(labor) rich may not speciaUze in the capital (labor) intensive good ail the time. Suppose the 
country concerned is capital rich and the capital intensive good is the less natural resource 
intensive, say good 2 in our model. Suppose further that p(0), the initial value of the intermediate 
good price ratio is low enough so that all three phases of production patterns occur. Then 
according to Corollary 3.1, this country will specialize in the labor intensive good until time 
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when it will begin a phase of diversification. At a later time this country will finally move into 
specialization in the capital rich good. The feet that this country is capital rich means that and U 
vwU be smaller than if it were not, but firom (63) the period of diversification will not be affected. 
2.4; Summary 
In this section of the paper we extended the GHOM of Kemp and Long (1984) to allow 
for different natural resource intensities. A dual approach was used which simplified the analysis 
substantially. The results indicate that unlike the Kemp-Long case there is no trivial steady state in 
this model. There are three potential regions of production. If the initial stage occurs, this will 
entail specialization in the more natural resource intensive good. This will be followed by a stage 
of varying shades of diversification. Increasing shares of income will be attributed to the 
production of the less natural resource intensive good as the intermediate good price ratios rises 
through the cone of diversification. The cone of diversification is fixed through time. The final 
stage will be characterized by specialization in the less natural resource intensive good. 
The results of this section may very well explain at least in part, the decline in the share of 
agriculture and other primary industries in the gross domestic product of most countries. Though 
this decline has been attributed to other factors in the grovrth literature, our results are not 
dependent upon the stage of development of a country. We find that, especially for natural 
resource rich countries, a decline in the share of natural resource intensive industries in GDP is 
expected over time as the resource base of the country declines. A necessary caveat here is that the 
presence of backstops may make it hard to verify empirically. 
Given the above results, a capital rich country need not export or even produce the more 
capital intensive good ever, or at least not always, nor does a labor rich countiy, the labor intensive 
good. It is usefial to emphasize that the three phases of production patterns suggested here are 
96 
potential and do not all have to occur. The actual pattern depends on the set of parameters 
prevailing. These results may help explain the Leontief paradox and other puzzling empirical 
observations about the static trade theorems. If preferences are identical across countries, as 
assumed in the H-0 model, then these production patterns also imply trade patterns. 
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3: THE GHOM WITH EQUAL NATURAL RESOURCE INTENSITIES AND 
POSITIVE MARGINAL EXTRACTION COSTS 
In this section we introduce a different extension to the Kemp-Long model. We revert to 
the assumption of equal resource intensities but now allow for positive mar^al costs of extraction. 
We employ the same dual approach that we used in previous sections. 
In a similar extension applied to the hybrid model of Kemp-Long, Ono (1982) showed that 
when positive mar^nal extraction costs are allowed, no trivial steady state ensues; rather there is 
necessarily a transition from one mode of specialization through a period of diversification to the 
opposite mode of specialization. In accordance with Ono's results we show in this section that 
after allowing for positive marginal extraction costs of the Cobb-Douglas form of technology in the 
GHOM of Kemp-Long, the results of their model are not upheld. Introducing extraction costs of 
the Cobb-Douglas form results in a cone of diversification that changes over time. The assumption 
of equal natural resource intensities means that unlike the previous section, the intermediate good 
price is constant over time. However, the dynamic nature of the cone of diversification leads to 
scenarios of production patterns similar to what we saw in the previous section 
3.1: Intermediate Good Production 
The production fiinction for the intermediate goods is still the same as in section 2.1: 
The dual cost function is 
/-* n TTr^i 
where Bj = (1 j . 
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The allocations of labor and capital in producing 0, and are again 
(Lfm. 
' fV ' R 
Now suppose that the natural resource input is extracted using labor and capital inputs. 
Suppose further that this extraction fiinction is also of Cobb-Douglas form so that 
E = G(,L,,K,) = V ^3 e(0,l) (64) 
Thus the dual cost function for resource extraction is 
C3 = e^EW'R}-"'. (65) 










Our resource constraints now take the form 
AO = B, 
(68) 
(69) 
where A and Q are as before and 5, = 




_a,[RK-{\-a,)TiE]-{ \ -a,){WL-a,r]E] 
and (70) 
(1 - a, - AjT/E] - or, [i?Ar - (1 - (71) 
Tt E 
Using the definitions of o), k, and p and also defining r = — and e = —, we may write 
W L 
Q _ RL {a.k - [(1 - a,) + (a, - ) ze]6j} 
(aj-a,)^, (72) 
a = /?Z,{[(l-a,)+ ze(a, -a^)\a}-a^k} 
(^2 )'^2 
Thus by similar manipulations as in the previous section we may conclude that 
Q > 0, 02 = 0 when p<pl : Only good 1 produced; Region I 
Q, > 0, ^2 > 0 when p^ipi ,p^ ): Both goods produced; Region II 









(^^n \4-(n —n 
Y"(e^ 
o J-V ' v^2 
(76) 
and again pl < p^' when a, a, • Th® cone of diversification is (pl ,p^'). Note that pl and ' 




In the GHOM where natural resovirce intensities differ and there are positive marginal costs of 
extraction, the interval of diversification in general is not fixed over time but has the tendency 
to change. 
Lemma 5: 
Under the conditions specified in this model the interval of diversification is fixed over time if 
and only if the cost of resource extraction and returns to the labor endowment are in constant 
proportion over time. 
Proof: 
First note from equations and that pj^' and Py' are both constant if and only if ze is constant 
Tj 7  ^(re = 0). Then by definition e = —— and hence p^' and py' are both constant if and only if 
rr  jU 
ti£ = cfVL where c is a constant. 
As we shall find out in the next subsection, with equal natural resource intensities, CO is 
constant over time. Hence X is also constant over time because it is a fimction of CO only. 
3.2: Final Good Production 
The final goods are produced according to the specifications of the Kemp-Long model, 
outlined in Section 2.2; 
X^ = E;QjiL^.K^y-\ i=\ ,2.  
Thus we have 
P = $2 S^/Pe [P^/^Pe] 1-a 
/ ^  ^ 




Now since p is constant any transitions in production patterns must result from changes 
in the boundaries of the interval of diversification. The only expression in p^' and p^;' that may 
have a tendency to change over tune is xe, the ratio of the cost of natural resource extraction as 
compared to the retums to labor. That p is constant implies also that CO is constant over time 
provided that final goods prices remain unchanged. We investigate production pattems in a 
manner similar to the previous section. Here we first obtain an expression for E{t). From 
above we have 
(l-a)Pe 
Substituting for 0, and from Section 3.1 we get 
O.LR a2k-(£>[{[-a2) + {a2 -a3)Te]+co[(l-a,)+(fl, -a^ yie]-a^ k (77) 
upon simplification. Collecting like terms together we finally have 
where jiq =a.{a^-a^) I  ii; = -  ^ 0^"' 
p ' 
^ 1 ,  = ( a , J " , / ( " - : )  
\ (p / 
f p \l/(l-a ) 
'0 2°' 
r = and vj •, = 
1 - a 
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Applying the isoperimetric constraint one can solve numerically for Pj(0). Totally 
differentiating the expression for £(/) we obtain 
E = 
Hz 
Again, since p is constant we have that & = 0 which means W=R.  Hence from the natural 







as in equation (24) we have 
£2Pe+(l-a)[a,fr+(l-a,)^] = ^  = 0 
c^*e + {\- a)[a^W•^{\-a^)R\ = P, =0 
Thus 
P e  =  — =  
a a  
Now it is important to note that when we allow for extraction costs, the net shadow value 
of the natural resource, which we will represent by X, is not equal to the gross value, P^. 
Specif ical ly ,  a = Pe- t j  
so that 
- n ^ X -1 T] ^ Xr Pe = — T}+—X = — n+—. 
Pe Pe Pe Pe 
Thn^ tnopthpr with tKic cn\rAC nc tho fXllrvunnrr 
--'O V"-"-/ — ^ *.AAW 
-iPe-T])ra « .  ^ fr = = R=t j  and 
r j a  + { l - a ) P e  (81) 
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Pe = {\-a){Pe-Ti)r  
Tja+(\-a)Pe 
Thus from (80) 
(82) 
E = { \ -a){P,-n)r 
- M s -  M i P e " "  J  + i ^ - a ) P ,  
(83) 
Equation (83) leads us to the following conclusion. 
Proposition 5: 
The rate of natural resource extraction is not constant. It depends on the values of Pe, the resource 
price and 7, the marginal cost of extraction. 
The time derivatives of the factor prices also imply the following. 
Proposition 6; 
Given the assumptions of our model the price of the natural resource rises over time while the 
prices of the Ricardian factors and the marginal cost of extraction all fall over time at the same 
increasing rate. 
The possible patterns of production are illustrated in Figures 3.1 through 3.5. As 
mentioned earlier, since p is constant, production patterns are determined by the paths of 
p[ and pIj relative to the constant value of p. 
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Figure 3.1 The GHOM with extraction costs but equal resource intensities: Case 1 
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Figure 3.2 The GHOM with extraction costs but equal resource intensities: Case 2. 
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Figure 3.3 The GHOM with extraction costs but equal resource intensities: Case 3 
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Figure 3.4 The GHOM with extraction costs but equal resource intensities: Case 4 
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Figure 3.5 The GHOM with extraction costs but equal resource intensities: Case 5 
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3.3: Summary 
The present section of this paper maintained the Kemp-Long assumption of equal resource 
intensities but allowed for positive marginal extraction costs. The analysis indicates that when 
positive marginal extraction costs are allowed in the Kemp-Long model their results are not 
upheld. Rather we find that three potential phases of production may occur. In the initial phase 
one of the goods may be produced alone. An intermediate phase of diversification is possible 
which may be followed by a final phase of speciali2a,tion in the other good. This result is similar to 
the findings of Ono (1982) whose analysis was performed in a two good, two input model. 
Furthermore Ono's results in the context of the hybrid model. He concluded that when nontrivial 
extraction costs are allowed there is a transition in the production scenarios fi^om specialization in 
the more natural resource intensive good through various shades of diversification to specialization 
in the less natural resource good. In this section allowing for positive marginal extraction costs 
leads to a dynamic cone of diversification so that alternative production patterns result even though 
the intermediate goods price ratio was constant over time. 
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4: THE GHOM WITH DIFFERENT NATURAL RESOURCE INTENSITIES 
AND POSITIVE EXTRACTION COSTS 
In this section we introduce the most general extension of the GHOM of Kemp-Long by 
combining the extensions of the previous sections. In section 2 we allowed for different natural 
resource intensities across the two sectors but maintained the assumption that the raw material is 
obtained costlessly from a ^ven natural resource stock. In section 3 we introduced positive 
marginal extraction costs but maintained the Kemp-Long assumption of equal natural resource 
intensities. We will now allow for positive marginal costs of extraction and different natural 
resource intensities and see what implications this has for production patterns. As Ono (1982) 
pointed out, simply allowing for positive costs of extraction is not enough since positive but 
constant costs of extraction would yield the same results as in the case of zero extraction costs. 
That natural resource extraction is a costly process is generally the rule rather than the 
exception. Allowng for this then together with different resource intensities would help us to more 
closely represent the issues that are considered in optimal decision making especially in a natural 
resource rich country. Ono (1982) allowed for positive mar^nal extraction costs in a two good -
two factor model and realized a sigmficant departure from the results of the two good - t^.vo factor 
zero extraction costs model. This was the hybrid model of Kemp-Long (1979). Whereas in the 
zero costs model of Kemp-Long (1979) a competitive economy always specializes in production, 
with positive marginal costs of extraction there is a transition from one mode of specialization 
through diversification to the opposite mode of specialization, the more natural resource intensive 
good being produced first. 
4.1: Intermediate Good Production 
The production of the intermediate good takes the same form as in sections 2.1; 
Oj = . 
I l l  
Furthermore, labor and capital inputs are used in the extraction of the natural resource according 
to equation (64) in Section 3.1: 
Thus all the results in Section 3.1 hold here as well. In particular the two intermediate goods are 
Q ^ -aJ[co-a,k} 
(a,-a,)5, 
which are equations (71) and (72). The cone of diversification, (p^' ,/7y'), has the same form as in 
equations (74) and (75) of Section 3.1. However, we shall see that they do not hold in exactly the 
same way. 
4.2: Final Good Production 
We will now turn to the production of the final good. Tne treatment here is much the same 
as in Section 2 and so equations (36) through (45) hold here as well except that and ' would 
replace and p^ respectively. Thus corresponding to equation (29) we have 
O, = 0, 02 > 0 o A', = 0, A', > 0 <=> p>pu 
Lemma 1 also holds here. Furthermore the dual version of the optimal control problem suggests 
that the net shadow value of the natural resource rises at the rate of interest. Hence as in the 
pre\aous sections we have 
E = G{L„K,) = K;-'-^L,'-' a, ^ (0,1) 
given as 
Q > 0, 02 = 0 o A", > 0, Xj = 0 p<pI 
G 02 >0 o X, >0, A', >0 o pe(p/,py') (84) 
A = Pe- T] (85) 
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where rj is the marginal cx)st of extraction. The results obtained in the previous section were based 
on the assumption that rj=0 so that A = Pe whence X = r = Pe. Now we have by differentiating 
(85) that 
A Tj ^ A '1 T} ^ Ar Pe = -^7+—;i = -^7+—. (86) 
Pe Pe Pe Pe 
The rate of change of the resource price is a weighted average of the rate of change of the 
marginal cost of extraction and that of the net shadow value of the resource. Thus if P^ rises 
slower than r it would mean that r] rises slower than P^ and conversely. More specifically, 
P^ e (min(77,r),max(;7,r)) 
From (66) we know that 
T]=a^+{\-a^)R. (87) 
Taking logarithmic derivatives of equation (38) we have 
a,Pe + (l-a,)5, =0 (88) 
a^Pe + (1 - 0^)5, = P, = 0. (89) 
S Also fi^om previous expressions for R and W and becausep = — we can write the following; 
5; 
5, - 5, = mPe = (^2 - or, )[W - .R] (90) 
= (91) 
R = (92) 
- (l-o,)5,-(l-a,)5, ir=- ' - (93) 
a, -o, 
Equations (90) through (93) and either of equations (88) or (89) form a five equation which can be 
solved for Pe, R, W. We first obtain Pe as 
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, (a,-a.)m Pe 
+—' — 
a. 7 J 
•I f 
-r — - 1  
A 
a, (a, -a^)m Pe 
Ll-a, a,-a, 7 J 
(94) 
Further simplification yields 
Pe = r{Pe-rT) 
[Pe+Sr}) (95) 
where 5=+ 
1-a, ^2~^l ^"^2 ^2~^! 
Thus by substitution we have 
/w(l-a,) a, 
_ - a, 
•(P^-77) 
. o-' -o. 
-S iPe- T ] )  
{Pe + 5r])  {Pe + Srj) (96) 
r a,/w or, ; I 1 r 
in re — n I 1 \ 1 • I I T% 
R = La,-a, l-a,J^ " la,-a. 
-o r\ re —v\ 
[Pe + dT]) [Pe + 5ri) (97) 
e -giKPg-T?) 
' (l-a,)(Pe + ^ ;7) ^ (98) 
5,=- -«,/•( Pe-77) 
(l-aj)(Pe + 57) 





Finally equations (87), (96) and (97) suggest upon simplification that 
(101) 
It is clear that if the price of the natural resource rises through time, then the intermediate 
good prices both fall through time and \dce versa. This is clear from (98) and (99) but is also 
readily apparent from the assumption that final good prices are constant. Some fiarther general 
observations are noteworthy. 
Lemma 6: 
The rate of change of the natural resource price and hence of all factor prices is not constant over 
time being rather dependent on the levels of Pe and rj. 
The expression for £,(t) takes the same form as in (52). However, in the presence of 
extraction costs the endogenous variables in k are now evaluated at different points than before. 
Denote by a superscript "1" the relevant variables as evaluated under positive mar^nal extraction 
costs. Then we have 
^(t)' =-K^ Pe{t)\ 
where is 
(102) 
1 Q;,(l-gi) 1 g;'(Qri -a^Y 
(103) 
1 + ^  
cTiCl-a,) 
A corresponding conclusion to Corollary 4.1 holds here as well. 
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Lemma?: 
When there are positive marginal costs of extraction as well as different natural resource intensities, 
the rate of growth of natural resource extraction is not an exogenously g?ven constant. It is a 
fimction of the ratio of the values of the intermediate goods (i'), of the relative price elasticity of 
the intermediate goods and of the levels of the natural resource price, Pe and mar^nal cost of 
extraction, ?]. 
It is apparent from (74) and (75) that the interval of diversification changes over time as zb 
changes. It is useful then to establish a characterization of the behavior of ze over time. This is 
provided in the following lemma. 
Lemma 8; 
1. ze falls over time if the more natural resource intensive good is also the more labor intensive 
good. 
2. ze falls over time regardless of the ranking of factor intensities if is sufiSciently large. 
Proof 
1. We need to show that re <0 whenever sigfi{a^ - ) = sign{a^ -<^2)-
Note that from above, e = ^  + E - W - L = t] + E - W 
But i] = (1-0^)65 + ^  
Cl 'y flfi - IC 
since CO = P 
mP^ 
Recalling that m = 
(g| -g;) 
we conclude that re <Q C I ^  (l-a,)(l-a,) 
whenever 5/g7/(a, - a,) = 5/gn(flr, -a,). 
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2. From the above expression for xe it is clear that if is sufficiently large, ze < 0 regardless of 
sign{a^ - ) or sign(a^ - a,). 
A similar lemma can be established for the relationship between the returns to labor and the 
natural resource. Define y/ = P^IW. Then we have the following. 
Lemma 9: 
1. y/e falls over time if the more natural resource intensive good is also the more capital intensive 
good. 
2. m falls over time regardless of the ranking of factor intensities if /c" is sufficiently large. 
Proof: 
1. We need to show that y/e <0 whenever sign{a^ - a,) = sigtiia^ - ) • 
From the variable definitions, 
y/e = Pe + E-W-L = Pe + E-W 
=Pd 1 nt{\-a,) g, 
1-a. 
. Alternatively, 
y/e = Pe 1 - v '  
a. 
+ -
a, - a, 1-a, 
Tf. . / s . / s . r. ,OT(l-<ar,) „ If sign(a^ ~ <^2) = ~0 0 
a, -a, a, -a, 
1 When a, > a,, /c' > and therefore 
1-a, 
1 m(\-a.^ a. 
y / e  < P d  1 - ^  — ^  — +  
= -Pd 
L 1-a, l-«i 
a, -a 1 -I 
< 0 for a. >a,. 








1 m(l-a,) a, 
1 _ -  ~-+-^  
1-a, 02~'^X 1~®2J 
a,-a, J 
<0 fora, >a,. 
The condition that sign(a^ ~ ^ 2)- •^'^('^2 ~<^i) suflBcient but not necessary for y/e to fall over 
time. It is necessary only when is small enough. 
2. As in Lemma 8 part 2. 
We will concern ourselves here only wth the case where tb falls over time. In this case we 
can obtain some usefiil characterizations about how the interval of diversification changes over 
time. The behavior of the boundaries of the interval of diversification as re falls can be categorized 
according to five parameter configurations. 
(A), a, = flj. In this case is fixed and rises over time. 
(B). ^2=03. In this case Py is fixed and falls over time. 
(C). e (min(a2,a3),max(a,,a3)). and Py' both rise overtime. 
(D). a, e (min(a,,a3),max(a,,a3)). and both fall over time. 
(E). 6 (min(a,,a,),max(<ar,,a,)). Pj,' falls and Py rises overtime. 
Tnese five cases are iilustraied in Figures 4.1 through 4.5. We have drawn aii the figures for the 
case where <2, > or, so that p rise over time. Furthermore, the figures have been drawn for the 
situation where all three regions of production occur. This need not be the case. The occurrence 
of Regions I and n depend upon the exogenous parameters of the system, such as the factor 
endowments and the technology parameters. 
As in the previous section we can obtain a more specific characterization of production 
patterns by applying the isoperimetric constraint. First we solve for E(t)\ the level of natural 
resource extraction when there are positive marginal extraction costs. From (48) we have that 
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Figure 4.1 The GHOM with extraction costs and different resource intensities: Case A 
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Figure 4.2 The GHOM with extraction costs and different resource intensities: Case B 
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Figure 4.3 The GHOM with extraction costs and different resource intensities: Case C 
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Figure 4.4 The GHOM with extraction costs and different resource intensities: Case D 
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aiO-ttz) P02 (106) 
Substituting the expressions for 0, and Oj we have after some simplifications, 
^ LiMok+M^P/'} . /w 
E = —rT: TTT" where y/^ = 





1-a, 1-a,''"' 1~Q^2 
a;(l-(Ji) ai(l-a;) 
1-a, 
• =  Mz = (a,-a^)a. {a.-a,)a, 
1-a, 1-a, P., 
^ = Ma = (.02-^1) 
^ y/d-a) 
M ya,/(a,-a,) 
,/^5 = i"2r°'.r= 
Y/(a:-a,) 
As before, it is not possible to obtain an explicit closed-form expression for Pe(0). We may thus 
resort to computer simulations to derive the locus of Pe(0) over some range of parameter values. 
This will help us to obtain /c»(0) and hence p(t) fi"om which we can infer the possibilities of 
specialization more explicitly. But without these simulations we can obtain analytical expression 
for the period of diversification which does not depend directly on the implicit solution value for 
Pe(0) but only indirectly through the ratio of the boundaries of the cone of diversification, 
Py I Pi. Let Pe{Q)~ be the value of Pe(0) that solves (42). Then p(0) = JPeiOy" or 
p(0 = JPeiOy" exp(mrr). Recall that the interval of diversification is now defined by (p^' ,Pu)-
Thus if p(0) <p^', then Stage I and therefore all stages occur and in that case is the time of 
transition firom Stage I to Stage n, where solves 
Pi = JPeiO)"" exp(/wrt,'). 
Similarly, ij is the time of transition from Stage 11 to Stage HI, where solves 












« 1 ^ 
Pu 
vype(o)~' 
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4.3: Summary 
In addition to allo\\dng for different natural resource intensities this section of the model 
extended the GHOM of Kemp and Long (1984) to permit positive marginal costs of extraction. 
The extraction technclog>' was represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function in which labor 
and capital are employed as inputs to aid in the extraction process. The resuhs indicate that the 
intermediate price ratio as well as the cone of diversification change over time. As in the previous 
section there are three potential stages of production. If the initial value of the intermediate price 
ratio is small enough and the time horizon is long enough all three stages will occur. In that case 
the initial stage will be characterized by specialization in the natural resource intensive good. This 
will be followed by a stage of varying shades of diversification and finally by a period of 
specialization in the less natural resource intensive good. As in the previous section the rate of 
extraction of the resource is a fijnction of time. In addition the rate of growth of the price of the 
resource is also a function of time. We find that when the resource intensive good is also capital 
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intensive the returns to the natural resource falls relative to the returns to labor. We restriaed 
ourselves to the case where the cost of natural resource was also falling relative to the returns to 
labor. Five general types of dynamic implications of the changes in the cone of diversification and 
the intermediate good price ratio were identified based on corresponding parameter configurations. 
In at least three of these it is clear that the cone of diversification widens over time. The major 
implications of positive mar^nal extraction costs as opposed to the previous section are with 
regard to the timing of the transitions fi'om one stage to another. 
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5: CONCLUSION 
In this paper we considered the dynamic issues of natural resource-trade models within the 
context of the GHOM of Kemp-Long. We extended their model to account for different natural 
resource intensities and positive mar^nal extraction costs. In the first part we considered different 
natural resource intensities but maintained zero costs of extraction. In the second part we allowed 
for positive marginal extraction costs but maintained equal resource intensities. Finally, in the last 
part we combined the first two extensions by allowing for positive marginal extraction costs and 
different natural resource intensities. Various propositions that differed from the Kemp-Long 
conclusions were established. 
The implication of different natural resource intensities is that the intermediate good price 
ratio takes on a dynamic nature, with a path that depends on the time profile of the price of the 
resource. On the other hand when positive marginal extraction costs are introduced, the cone of 
diversification is no longer static but dynamic with a path determined in part by the path of resource 
extraction and in part also by the path of the wage rental ratio. .Aii the thxee models considered 
here suggest that no definite production pattern exists for all parameter realizations. A brief 
summary of the results of these models is given in Table 1. The likely production pattern for any 
gjven country is an issue that can only be resolved empirically. However, simulation results 
provide insights into how thcss patterns chsngc with ccrtsin ksy psrsmstcrs such ^ Isngtli of tims 
horizon, rate of interest and initial stock of natural resource. 
One important implication of these results is that a country endowed in a given resource 
need not export or even produce the good relatively intensive in that resource all the time. This 
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may help explain the occurrence of the Leontief paradox. When natural resource inputs are 
considered production patterns could change over time so that a pattern of production existing at a 
given time is not necessarily what will pertain at a future time. 
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DEVELOPING COUNTRY RESOURCE EXTRACTION 
UNDER FOREIGN DEBT AND INCOME UNCERTAINTY 
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1: INTRODUCTION 
The importance of natural resource and environmental issues in international 
economics has drawn the serious attention of economists since the early 1970's. Natural 
resource and environmental issues on their own had been of great interest for many years. 
However, the integration of these issues into trade had to await the great drive for 
environmental cleanness in the early 1970's and the OPEC-sponsored oil price hikes of 1973-
74. Since then many studies have been done to explain the linkages between international 
trade and domestic and worldwide resource and environmental issues. 
Studies on natural resource-trade issues have either been verbal, theoretical 
(analytical) or empirical. Verbal treatments mainly in interdisciplinary journals have usually 
brought to the fore, economic, political and natural scientific issues that have generated much 
public opinion. Theorerical/analytical studies have been done to see how the theoretical 
foundations of the international trade literature as well as that of the natural resource and 
environmental economics literature are affected by issues integrating the two disciplines. 
Useful reviews of these studies are given in Kemp and Long (1984), Withagen (1985) and 
Segerson (1988). Empirical studies in this area are very few, which is not surprising since it is 
extremely difficult to obtain data on natural resource stocks or depletion rates or 
environmental pollution. 
The results of most of the analytical studies provide useful insights that are applicable 
in a broad sense to natural resource issues in every country in the world. Such broad 
treatments are useful for a general understanding of economic decision making in any country' 
that is endowed with natural resources and is also open to international trade. However, for 
an appropriate appraisal of policies pertaining to a specific country or region, such broad 
treatments provide only limited insight. 
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As much as natural resource issues are of some importance to every nation it is much 
more so for countries that are relatively natural resource rich or relatively less endowed with 
other factors of production. Typically such countries tend to be the less developed in the 
world. As the literature in growth and development theory suggests, as a country grows, it 
depends less and less upon its endowment of natural resources. The purpose of this paper is 
to contribute to the analytical study of natural resource-trade issues in a way that applies more 
specifically to the less developed natural resource rich countries of the world. This choice of 
emphasis is justifiable on various grounds. 
First, since we focus on a more uniform, though smaller , group of nations the results 
have greater chance of applicability. Second, this treatment enables us to tackle some more 
specific issues relating to these countries that may not be regarded as representative of all 
nations in general. One such issue is the large external debt of developing nations. 
Substantial verbal treatment has been documented on the impact of external debt on resource 
extraction in developing countries. This paper will provide an anlytical treatment of these 
issues. Furthermore, we wall move a step closer to what pertains in reality by allowing for 
some level of uncertainty in income. This is more pertinent to developing countries for 
various reasons. Uncertainty in output is more relevant for least developed countries (LDCs) 
because agriculture accounts for a large portion of income and agricultural operations are 
subject to more uncertainty than nonagricultural enterprises. Uncertainty in price is also more 
relevant to LDCs. The uncertainty and progressive fall in terms of trade for these countries 
has been blam.ed for most of the economic retardation seen in LDCs especially during the 
early 1980s. By accounting for some form of uncertainty in income we hope to draw some 
useful conclusions about resource extraction and international trade in these countries. 
Given the foregoing we will proceed now to give a brief review of the relevant 
literature after which the analytical model will be presented. 
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2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The pertinent issues tackled in this paper relate to developing country resource 
extraction, external debt and default risk under uncertainty. The review of literature is 
organized into two not necessarily disjoint, subsections. The first subsection deals with 
developing country resource extraction. The second deals with the external debt of 
developing nations and the possibility of default partly due to some uncertainty. 
2.1: Developing Country Resource Extraction 
Environmental concerns relating to developing countries have heightened over the past 
few decades. The general notion is that high rates of deforestation or resource extraction 
have been triggered by the desire of LDCs to achieve an appreciable rate of growth. 
Larson and Bromley (1991) suggested that domestic and export price policies for 
primary commodities have played a major role in the alarming rate of deforestation in 
developing nations. In the case of Acacia Senegal trees in the Sahel region of Africa they 
showed that price policies in Sudan have been a crucial factor in inducing higher rates of 
deforestation. In another study Fardmanesh (1991) also showed that terms of trade shocks 
could be used to explain why the agricultural sector declined and the manufacturing sector 
expanded in most oil exporting countries in the 1970's contrary to the standard conclusions of 
Dutch Disease models. He considered a small open economy in both short run and long run 
situations. He showed that in the long run the world price effect is the only cause of the 
decline in the agricultural sector. 
Strand (1992) studied developing country resource extraction and investment when 
the country receives foreign aid. He considered the case where the aid is targeted such that 
the amount of aid is conditional on the level of resource extraction and on the level of capital 
investment. He contrasted this with the case where aid is unconditional. Also considered in 
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his two-period model are the alternative cases of costless as opposed to costly extraction of 
the natural resource stock. He showed that when the unconditional aid is shifted from period 
2 to period 1 the likely resuh is a postponement of extraction to period 2. Furthermore, it was 
shown that investment subsidies tend to promote early extraction. It is important to note that 
the results of this study might differ appreciably if external debt rather than foreign aid were 
considered. We now discuss briefly the studies relating to developing country debt. 
2.2; Developing Country Debt And Default Risk 
Since the incidence of the debt crisis in the 1980s many studies have been done to help 
explain its occurrence and possible prevention and cure. Accordingly the literature on the 
debt of especially the poorer nations of the world has focussed mainly on the following issues: 
1. What does the debt crisis entail and what caused it? 
2. How can it be solved and how could it be prevented? 
3. What are its effects on the international credit market and the growth and stability of debtor 
countries? 
The first question has been answered in part by an appeal to the literature on credit 
rationing. Related to this are studies on the credit worthiness of debtor countries, as proxied 
by such measures as solvency, liquidity, repudiation risk and time consistency issues. As to 
the second question many alternative solutions have been proposed and the literature abounds 
with economic analysis of the most prominent of these- such include the debt conversion 
schemes, in particular debt-equity swaps that have been proposed for many countries, and also 
the alternative of debt forgiveness. The attempts at the third question, also alluding to credit 
rationing, have focussed on the impacts of the debt burden on investment in debtor countries. 
One of the papers that considers more fully the various reasons for a credit constraint 
is that of Cooper and Sachs (1985). They gave three reasons for a debt ceiling or constraint: 
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A. Solvency Constraint: They argue that one reason for a credit ceiling is that borrowing is 
bound by the country's long-run capacity to service its debt. From a creditor's perspective 
long-run solvency only requires that the debtor has the future resources to service its debt, 
without the need to borrow forever in order to make interest payments. 
B. Liquidity Constraint: This may occur when a country owes more in a given period than it 
can service in the absence of new loans. The potential that a country may be illiquid may 
influence creditors to set a lower credit ceiling than usual. 
C. Repudiation Risk: There may be a risk that the country will choose not to repay its debt 
even though it is well able to do so. Such a risk might also result in a lower than usual credit 
ceiling. 
Thus a country's capacity to borrow will reflect creditor's concerns about its solvency, 
liquidity and repudiation risk. Cooper and Sachs (1985) incorporated each of these 
considerations in turn (but not simultaneously) into a model of borrowing behavior to 
determine the optimal borrowing path for a typical debtor country. The authors mentioned 
that if the debtor country's income is growing at a rate n greater than the rate of interest r on 
its debt, it is solvent and should not be constrained by the solvency criterion. However, even 
if n is less than r but the creditor nations are growing at a rate higher than r, debtor insolvency 
might not pose any problem because creditors may always be willing to make new loans to 
debtors to keep them afloat. If creditor nations are always growing faster than r, then "such a 
Ponzi scheme is viable forever" because even though the borrower's debt grows at the rate r 
and becomes iniinite, it becomes a decreasing proportion of creditors' wealth. 
Cooper and Sachs (1985) also considered the cases of no-repudiation and repudiation. 
In the case of repudiation they assumed a two-part default penalty. First the borrower's 
production is reduced perhaps due to trade restrictions. Secondly the borrower is excluded 
from ail further borrowing. In a two period variant of their model they considered the 
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possibility of the debtor precommiting to an investment level in the first period because it 
provides more favorable lines of credit. However, it may renege on this promise even if the 
promise was optimal ex ante. They argued that precommitment makes sense when 
investment is quite profitable and the rate of time discount is not too high. 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) had earlier considered the inconsistency of optimal plans. 
The mmn argument of their paper was that optimal control theory which delineates a path for 
control and state variables based on current specifications, is not appropriate for economic 
planning even when there is a well-defined and agreed-upon, fixed social objective fiinction. 
They argued that relying on some policy rules rather than discretionary policy will improve 
economic performance. However, unlike Friedman (1948) their argument for rules does not 
rely on ignorance of the timing and magnitude of the effects of policy. The chief reason for 
this paradox is that decisions of agents depend in part upon their expectations of future policy 
actions. Thus if these expectations are not invariant to the fiiture policy selected, optimal 
control theoiy would not be appropriate in general. The basic idea is that the policy maker 
usually fails to take into account the effect of his policy rule on the optimal decision rules of 
the economic agents. Using a two-period model they showed that the consistent policy is, in 
general, not optimal because it does not take into account the effect of future policies on 
current decisions of agents. 
Calvo (1978) analyzed the time consistency of monetary policy in the framework of 
Ramsey-Friedman in which the optimal policy maximizes a sum of instantaneous utilities, 
utilities being functions of consumption and real monetar>' balances. However, unlike 
Friedman (1969), he assumed that lump sum taxation is not a feasible policy tool. Hence all 
taxes are disortionary in his model. He defined time inconsistency as occurring if the optimal 
value of money at time "t>to when calculated at time to is not optimal from the vantage point 
of some fliture time (before t)". His paper concluded that under perfect foresight the optimal 
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monetary policy will be time inconsistent and that this is not necessarily due to a disharmony 
between government and individuals' objective functions. Rather time inconsistency arises in 
his model because of the nature of the demand for money and the fact that its creation 
generally implies the use of distortionary taxes. 
Over the past decade or so many debtor nations repurchased part of their foreign bank 
debt at secondary market prices. These open market buybacks include debt-equity swaps as 
for example, in the case of Brazil and direct repurchases by domestic government-controlled 
banks as in the case of Mexico. It has been argued that such buybacks are beneficial to debtor 
countries since they stimulate investment. However, Bulow and Rogoff (1991) argued that 
debtor countries do not gain by repurchasing external bank debt at market discount because 
the buybacks allow creditors to reap more than 100% of any efficiency gains that might result 
from increased investment. 
They used a five-stage model in their analysis. Debt, D®, is inherited in Stage 1. In 
Stage 2 the amount X of the country's initial resources, W^, it wants to devote to the buyback 
* 
is chosen. The post buyback debt is D , a function of X and investor expectations about 
0 * future repayments. In Stage 3 the country allocates W - X = W to investment I and direct 
consumption, C. In Stage 4 production uncertainty (shock variable 0) is resolved, so that 
gross income Y = C + 0g(I) is determined. In the final stage the country makes repayments, 
R, to foreign creditors and consumes Y-R. They showed that the optimal level of buyback is 
zero in this case. They then derived alternative conditions under which some buybacks might 
be profitable but asserted that this is very unlikely in practice. 
In a similar paper Cohen (1993) provided a "valuation formula for LDC debt to assess 
(a) the price at which a debt buyback is advantageous to the country; (b) the value to creditors 
of having the flows of payment guaranteed against the extrinsic stochastic disturbances faced 
by the country; and (c) the trade-off between growth of payments and levels of payments". 
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He showed that there is a gap between the debt relief which is nominally granted to a debtor 
and the actual relief given up by the creditor (measured in terms of the net transfers which the 
debtor is expected to pay). From his simulation results he concluded that if a country 
announces in advance that it wants to repurchase half of the face value of its debt it may end 
up over-paying the market value of debt by about 45%. 
His analysis was cast in a two-period model. The country has the option to repudiate 
its debt. In that case banks can credibly impose a sanction worth XQ where ?i e (0,1) and Q is 
country's income, and that creditors can always get the country to pay them XQ upon 
repudiation. 
Helpman (1989) also analyzed the conditions under which debt-equity swaps are 
beneficial to a debtor nation as well as its creditors. In his model the government of the 
debtor nation is responsible for paying off its debt. To do so the government uses the tax 
revenue. The government taxes the income of domestic residents at a rate t. The tax rate 
cannot exceed a set limit so that the government's ability to service the debt is restricted. 
Another restriction on debt service ability results fi-om the fact that output in the debtor nation 
is subject to a productivity shock ~6 so that for some realizations of 6 debt will be fully repaid 
while for other realizations partial repayment will occur. There is no explicit penalty for 
partial repayment. It is assumed in his model that tax revenues are first allocated to debt 
repayment before anything else so that in those states of nature for which tax revenue falls 
short of the debt service payments required, creditors receive all of the tax revenue. Helpman 
then considered the possibility that a debt-equity swap could improve the state contingent 
utilities of the debtor nation and its creditors. He showed that under some conditions there 
exist small Pareto-improving swaps. Also the larger the debt to be swapped the lower the 
price the debtor will receive for his equity. Furthermore in the presence of a competitive 
fringe of creditors circumstances exist in which no small swaps will occur even though Pareto-
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improving small swaps might be available. He also showed that debt forgiveness reduces 
investment in the debtor nation. 
Aizenmann and Borensztein (1989) identified conditions under which renewed lending 
may be beneficial to both developed and developing countries. The terms of trade between 
debtor and creditor nations may be significantly affected by the financial flows between them. 
As such appropriate lending terms should internalize such terms of trade effects. However, a 
competitive international banking system is not likely to do so. There is therefore, a role for 
policymakers in imposing the required conditionality for lending. The terms of trade effects 
on debtors depend on the slope of the demand curve for their exports. They assumed this to 
be downward sloping. In their analysis they used a two-period two-good model of the world 
economy consisting of two blocks of nations - developed and developing. Thus their 
framework was at a global level and not with respect to individual countries. Each block 
produces one good and consumes both. Their model also incorporated debt negotiations over 
two parameters - the proportion of new lending devoted to investment (p) and the proportion 
of the increase in debtor GDP that will be paid back to creditors (x). They showed that 
developing countries benefit as long as and B<1. They concluded that in the absence of 
strict investment conditionality renewed lending tends to be associated with an improvement 
in the terms of trade of the developing country. 
In his bid to explain the occurrence of credit rationing Allen (1983) considers the case 
where individual agents borrow for production and default costs are endogenous. In his 
model interest on old debts has to be paid before new debt can be ser»'iced so that borrowers 
contract with only one lender. An initial exogenous distribution of wealth determines those 
who are borrowers (no wealth) and those who are lenders. Loans are used to buy an infinitely 
durable capital good. Upon default the lender seizes the borrower's capital. So it is only 
possible to default on the interest of the loan. Borrowers differ in their ability. Each persons 
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output depends on his ability and the amount of capital he uses. People are risk neutral. The 
penalty for default is exclusion from the capital market. Thus contracts are enforceable 
(credible) as long as current payment does not exceed the value of future access to the 
market. If this constraint binds, credit rationing occurs. This may be so strict that no 
borrowing is possible. In the case where people can save and the use of collateral is feasible 
credit is again rationed when the no-default constraint is binding, but only temporarily until 
borrowers acquire enough assets to guarantee payment on the amount of capital required to 
equate marginal product to the opportunity cost of capital. 
In Jafifee and Russell (1976) their model of credit rationing under imperfect 
information led to the conclusion that a single contract equilibrium would tend to occur at a 
point of rationing and that multiple-contract equilibria, if they occur, would likely be unstable. 
They assumed that borrowers are regarded as honest with no expectation of default at all. 
The price of credit they used is the contract rate. Vandell (1984) extended the work of Jaffee 
and Russell (1976) to incorporate defauh expectations on the demand side. For the price of 
credit he used the net yield rather than the contract rate. He concluded that rationing is not 
necessary in a single-contract equilibrium case and that an unstable equilibrium is not possible 
in a multiple-contract case. The demand model is a two-period consumption model. On the 
supply side a competitive loan market is assumed with lenders obtaining their funds in a 
perfect capital market. Lenders are assumed to maximize the expected value of their profits 
and to be either risk neutral or serving a very large group of customers with independent risks. 
Campbell and Chan (1992) characterized the decisions on optimal use of debt and 
equity in different situations where both ex ante and ex post observability problems exist. The 
ex ante problem is a moral hazard concerning the firm's investments and resuks in an incentive 
cost of debt. The ex post problem results in monitoring costs leading to a cost advantage for 
debt. The incentive costs are modeled in the context of an asset substitution problem with a 
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risky and a risk-free asset. They concluded that when incentive costs are taken as given, debt 
will be preferred if incentive costs are less than the cost of monitoring in situations when the 
firm is solvent. They also investigated firm behavior to find out whether the ex ante lack of 
observability of the firm's investments will have any implications for aggregate investment 
relative to the first-best investment. They concluded that at an optimum the firm will 
overinvest in a risky investment relative to the riskless one. This result is shared also by 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Furthermore in comparison with the first-best levels the level of 
investment in the risk-free asset would be less but that of the risky investment could go either 
way. The first best level for each type of investment was defined as that for which the 
expected marginal return for the investment is equal to one. 
Aizenmann (1989) studied the role of investment policies when there is risk of default 
by a country. In his two-period model the default penalty is tied directly to trade (openness of 
the economy). His model includes investment by private agents, and is multisectoral. The 
default decision on debt payment to external creditors is made by the central bank which has 
the objective of maximizing the expected welfare of a representative consumer. He shows 
that credit supply is determined by aggregate borrowing and by its decomposition among 
consumption and investment activities. The supply for credit schedule in this case is upward 
sloping for intermediate levels of credit but may include a backward bending portion because a 
rise in the interest rate has two opposing effects on expected returns - for a given probability 
of default, it increases the expected yield; however, it also reduces the probability of payment, 
thus decreasing the expected yield. Investment in a given sector is determined by the expected 
incidence of default and the relative exposure of that sector to international trade. Different 
sectors depend on international trade differently (through their dependence on imported 
inputs). Hence the impacts of default risk on the sectors differ. Also, optimal tax rates on 
these sectors that will result in sector-specific social interest rates also differ. He derived 
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these social rates for consumption and for investment in the various sectors. Upon default 
investment in the sectors more heavily dependent on international trade is more heavily 
affected. He showed also that swapping nominal debt for equity may help reduce country risk 
but does not eliminate the flindamental problems associated with international credit - does 
not eliminate the need to impose a credit ceiling on available credit though it may allow an 
increase in the ceiling. Equity finance eliminates defaults up to the credit ceiling. 
Krugman (1985) notes that there are two major types of default costs. One alternative 
is the seizure of the country's assets. Another is exclusion of that country from trade. 
However, there is also the possibility that the debtor country will renegotiate with the creditor 
and the bargaining solution would be different. He used a two-period model to show that it is 
possible and rational for creditors to lend to borrowers in order to prevent them from 
defaulting. In his model the borrower begins in period 1 with inherited debt to be paid in 
periods 1 and 2. Borrowing is also allowed in period 1 to be paid in period 2. As in most 
models a fixed sanction is imposed on defaulting debtors. This issue of involuntary lending by 
creditors was considered also by Cline (1983). 
All the foregoing works provided a theoretical analysis of debt issues. Some empirical 
works on debt as it relates to developing countries are also worth mentioning. Using 
correlation and analysis of variance methods Kaminarides and Nissan (1993) showed that 
international debt impacts small countries differently depending upon their levels of income. 
Their results showed that among the debtor nations, higher-income countries can afford larger 
debt than lower-income countries. 
Bacha (1992) suggested that net transfers are a better measure of the impact of 
external debt on the growth of LDCs than foreign capital inflows. His analysis of the impact 
of foreign indebtedness on growth of developing countries also considers the case of a foreign 
exchange constraint. 
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Contrary to the general opinion that external debt leads to an investment decline in 
heavily indebted countries, Warner (1992) showed via an empirical analysis that his opinion is 
not supported by the data and that falling export prices and high world interest rates in the 
early 1980s could have been the more direct causes of the investment decline observed since 
the international debt crisis began. His approach was to see how well equations without any 
debt-related information forecast the investment declines that occured. He contends that since 
the errors associated with forecasts were quite small, debt-related factors might not have been 
as important as generally expected. 
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3: BASIC FRAMEWORK 
In this paper we consider a multiperiod model of a developing country which 
borrows in the international capital market to finance its capital investment. In each period t a 
s ing l e  good  i s  p roduced  in  t h i s  e conomy  us ing  cap i t a l  AT,  and  a  na tu ra l  r e sou rce  i npu t  R, .  
Unless otherwise specified we shall assume a constant returns to scale technology in the 
following sections. The preferences of domestic residents are represented by a utility function 
which has consumption in the given period as its argument. Consumption in a given period 
is denoted by C,. Future utility streams are discounted by a constant and exogenously given 
discount factor S. At the beginning of the initial period the country has a stock of capital AT, 
and is also endowed with a natural resource stock R. For the purposes of analytical 
simplicity we shall assume that the resource input i?, for each period is costlessly extracted 
from the given stock. In addition we also assume that the stock of natural resource grows at 
an exogenous rate g in each period, g e (0,1). 
The market for credit is perfectly competitive so that economic profits accruing to 
creditors are zero. Thus creditors will lend to a debtor nation as long as the expected returns 
firom lending are equal to the returns they would obtain had they invested the fiinds in their 
domestic economies at the domestic risk-free rate of interest . Further details of the model 
will be specified in the sections to which they apply. Our key objective is to see how resource 
extraction and investment decisions are affected by the external debt burden facing the 
developing country. We will allow for the possibility of default and see how this might occur 
and how it impacts the resource extraction and investment decisions. Uncertainty in output 
will play a key role in explaining the occurrence of default. Before this, however, we begin in 
the next section with a deterministic model so as to facilitate comparison between creditor 
behavior with risk-free lending and their behavior when there is default risk. 
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4: MODEL WITHOUT DEFAULT RISK OR UNCERTAINTY 
As our first tack we shall consider a deterministic situation in which there is no 
income uncertainty and the probability of default is zero. We model a three period planning 
horizon of a developing debtor nation in which borrowing is permissible in the first two 
periods. In this deterministic setting full debt repayment is made in the period after which 
borrowing is made. Income is affected by some productivity or price variations which we 
represent collectively by 6. However, the values of these shock parameters are fully and 
correctly known at the beginning of the initial period so that there is no uncertainty. Due to 
the absence of default risk and the assumption of perfect competition creditors charge the 
same level of interest which, save for the level of borrowing, is independent of any parameters 
or choices peculiar to the debtor nation. The assumptions of this section allow for the interest 
rate to be a function of the level of borrowing. However, we shall assume a given and 
constant level of interest which is thus equal to the rate operating in creditor nations. 
To be more specific income, K, in period t consists of X„ the period t value of 
output for all three periods and the level of net borrowing for the first two periods. Thus 
Y, = X,+B„ (I) 
Fj = X, + 5, and (2) 
Y, = X, .  (3) 
We shall assume throughout this paper that the income shock terms affect the value of output 
multiplicatively so that X, = O^f {K,, ) where AT, is the capital stock in period l and R, is 
the level of natural resource extraction in the same period. Income is allocated partly to 
consumption in each period. Income is also allocated to capital investment in periods 1 and 2 
and to debt repayment in periods 2 and 3. Investment made in period t augments the capital 
stock for use in period / + 1, t = \,2. The capital stock depreciates at a constant rate a in 
eveiy period. Furthermore, for the most part we will assume that for t = 1,2, the investment 
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relation is given simply by (f>{K,,K,^^) = Thus our three budget 
constraints are 
Q + ) -K , ( \ -a )<X ,+B,=  dJ iK ,  ,R , )  +  B ,  (4) 
C + (1 + )B, + I{K, )-K^{\-a)<X^^B,= ej{K, ,11J + B, (5) 
C3 +( l  +  ro )5 ,  <  ^ 3  =  dJ{K„R, )  (6) 
We also have the constraint on natural resource extraction 
il,<(l + g)^(i?-/2,)-(l + g)i^.. (7) 
Given the above formulation, the problem of the government of the debtor nation is to 
maximize the welfare criterion given by 
= U{C, )+SU{C. )  +  5 -U{C^)  (8) 
with the appropriate choice of consumption levels (C,,C2,C3), resource extraction rates 
capital investment levels and the levels of borrowing subject to 
the budget constraints and the constraint on resource extraction. The Lagrangian for this 
problem can be vwitten as 
= U{C,)^5U{C.)^5-U{C^) +^_ej{K,,R{) + B, -C, -/(/:,)+ /:,(!-cr)] 
+;ij [e j {K . , /?,) + - C - (1 + )B, - I (K , ) + /:, (1 - cr)] 
+W(/C3,i?3)-C3-(l+ro)5J+A,[(l + g)^(;?-/?,)-(l + g)/^-i23] (9) 
where A^and /I4 are nonnegative Lagrange multipliers. 
We shall assume that the functions and / satisfy the following conditions: 
fKK^ < 0  and that / is homogeneous of degree one so that /r  R,  +/k = f ,  
K R  Irr, = ~/kjc, /fj. = -/^ '. We also assume nondecreasing investment costs so 
'  Rt '  '  
that If. >0 and 7™ > 0, t = 1,2. 
The first order conditions for an interior solution are as follows 
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, - A , = 0  ( 1 0 )  
<51/,-Aj=0 (11) 
d-U^-2.^ = 0 (12) 
-0+^)'^4=o (13) 
^2^24-0 + ^ )^=0 (14) 
~^4 (15) 
-A^k,+M^2/K,+0-'^)] = ^ (16) 
-A^x,+Wk,=0 (17) 
A , - A , ( l + r o )  =  0  ( 1 8 )  
A,-A3(l+ro) = 0 (19) 
,/(/:„/?,)+5,-C,-/(^3) + ^ ,(l-cr) = 0 (20) 
J{K.,R.) + 5, - C - (1 +ro)5, - I{K^) + /C,(l - a) = 0 (21) 
J{K^,R,)-C,-{\+r^)B^ = {i (22) 
(l + ^ )^(i?-i?.)-(l + g)/?,-i^ = 0 (23) 
Equations (10) through (23) can be reexpressed and combined to give a seven equation 
system that is more easy to interprete. 
U, A, 
5U. " 2, 
U. A, 







Equation (30) says that the cost of incurring an additional unit of debt is constant 
across time; that is, the cost of inheriting one unit of debt in period 1 is the same as that in 
period 2. Equations (24) and (25) together imply that the intertemporal marginal rate of 
substitution is constant being equal to the constant cost of borrowing times the constant 
discount factor. The left hand side of (26) represents the intertemporal marginal rate of 
technical substitution across periods 1 and 2. This is also equal to the unit cost of borrowing. 
The cost of using one unit of the resource in period 1 rather than in period 2 is +g. Put in 
o the r  words  t he  va iue  o f  l eav ing  an  add i t i ona !  un i t  o f  t he  r e sou rce  in t ac t  f o r  pe r iod  2  i s  + g .  
Thus the marginal product of the resource in period 2 is multiplied by +g in order to 
compare it with that in period 1. The optimal condition then for natural resource allocation 
across the two periods is that the MRTS be equal to the unit cost of borrowing. A similar 
interpretation holds for (27). 
Equation (28) says that the marginal benefit per unit cost of capital use in period 2 
should be equal to the marginal cost of debt. Notice that as long as ere(0,1) the marginal 
product of capital will not be equated to +rg. Rather ='b +<^>'0 which means that 
the presence of depreciation necessitates a lower level of capital use than would be optimal in 
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the absence of depreciation. Also since 62/k. =^o + ^+^0 the level of capital use will be 
higher than that which would pertain in the case of circulating capital (fiill depreciation). 
Equation (29) suggests that the marginal product of capital in period 3 per unit investment 
cost is equal to the unit cost of borrowing at the optimum. 
Substituting (30) into (26) through (29) and using (23) we have five independent 
equations in five endogenous variables i?,, R,, R^, and which means that we can solve 
for these variables uniquely from the five equation set in terms of the exogenous parameters. 
In particular, the optimal input use levels are not functions of S, the discount factor. This 
suggests a separation of production choices from consumption decisions. The reason for this 
is the presence of borrowing oppotunities in the international capital market. 
We will now proceed to analyze comparative static effects of the exogenous 
parameters on the levels of the choice variables. 
4.1: Comparative Statics In No-Default Deterministic Model 
In order to obtain comparative static results for all the parameters we first totally 
differentiate the system of first order conditions. Then we ran a Maple V Release 2 program 
which produced comparative static expressions not presented here. The expressions are 
available upon request from the author. The signs of these comparative static derivatives are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1 shows that an increase in the discount factor leads to a deferrment in 
consumption and a decline in the level of borrowing. However, it has no impact on input 
allocations in the model with no default risk. An increase in the growth rate of the natural 
resource acts as an income effect that leads to increased consumption in all periods; but it also 
leads to a deferrment in resource extraction and capital investment while its impact on the 
levels of borrowing is ambiguous. An increase in the initial capital stock has an income effect. 
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Consumption rises in all periods. Furthermore, period 1 resource extraction is higher while 
capital investment and borrowing levels all decline. Resource extraction in both periods 2 and 
3 are lower. 
An increase in , leads to an increase in consumption for all periods, an increase in 
resource extraction and capital investment in period t and a decline in the same in all the other 
periods. When , increases, there is a decline in periods 1 and 2 borrowing. When , 
increases, there is a decrease in period 2 borrowing and an increase in period 1 borrowing 
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while for an increase in 3 there is a decline in period 2 borrowing, but the impact on period 1 
borrowing is ambiguous. 
For an increase in the world rate of interest, period 1 consumption falls and resource 
extraction in the same period rises. All other effects are contingent on the realizations of 
other parameters. A higher initial resource stock has a pure income effect, leading to an 
increase in consumption, resource extraction and capital stock in all periods. Its impact on 
borrowing is, however, ambiguous. Finally a higher rate of depreciation means lower 
consumption in all periods and a decline in period 2 investment and resource extraction while 
for the other periods the input levels rise. It also means a higher level of period 2 borrowing, 
leaving an ambiguous impact on period 1 borrowing. 
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5: MODEL WITH DEFAULT POSSIBILITY AND INCOWIE 
UNCERTAINTY 
In this section we introduce the possibility that the debtor nation will default on its 
debt payment obligations. As in the earlier section borrowing is allowed in periods 1 and 2. 
Payment is required in period 2 for period 1 borrowing and in period 3 for period 2 
borrowing. In this section the realization of the period 2 income shock, is not known at 
the beginning of the initial period. However, 6^ is known for certain at the very beginning, as 
well as the period 1 shock, 0^. Thus both lenders and debtors form expectations about ft. 
We assume that the subjective distribution of 0 is the same for creditors and debtors and that 
the mean E[6\= $ and variance var(^ = Vg are common knowledge at the beginning of the 
initial period. 
Debtors will make their default decisions based on optimality criteria. Thus default 
occurs if the expected utility from the default decision exceeds that from the no-default 
decision. Default risk arises from the uncertainty introduced by 0, because future realizations 
of 0 may differ from expectations, making it necessary for the debtor nation to revise its 
decisions. As we mentioned above, the probability density function of , is common 
knowledge fironi the beginning of the planning horizon. The penalty for default is an 
exemption from flirther borrowing and also from international trade in general. Though not 
modeled explicitly here, we suppose that the exemption from trade causes a reduction in 
debtor nation income. Again we can imagine this to be explained by the possibility that 
exclusion from trade means that it is now difficult for the debtor nation to purchase some 
inputs required for its production process. This we assume, leads to a reduction in 
productivity. Alternatively this can be explained by the possibility that the debtor nation is 
excluded from trading with most nations and now has to purchase needed inputs at higher 
than usual prices from some other country. Thus the reduction in income could in this case be 
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represented by a fall in the debtor nation's terms of trade. Either one or both of the above 
motivations could be implied in this model. We introduce this income reduction 
multiplicatively by a parameter y €(0,1). The lower is y, the stronger is the impact of the 
trade exemption on the debtor nation. We assume that y is common knowledge at the 
beginning of the plarming horizon. The default penalty is imposed in the period of default and 
the debtor loses credit worthiness so that the penalty is maintained for all succeeding periods. 
5.1: Creditor Response To Default Risk 
In view of the default risk and the fact that creditors receive no remuneration when 
this occurs we suppose that they adjust the lending terms to prevent or minimize any losses 
from the occurrence of a defauh. Let tt be the creditors' subjective probability that the debtor 
vwll default. We assume that the higher the level of borrowing, B, the more it costs the 
debtor to repay and thus the more likely a default. Thus, though yet to be proven, k is 
modeled here as decreasing in B. Later, this can be shown to be consistent with the 
optimization behavior of economic agents. We also expect to be a function of 9 and v^, 
the mean and variance of the distribution of Q. We assume that tz as a function of B is 
knowTi to debtor nation as well. 
The creditor eams for each unit of capital invested in its domestic economy at 
the risk-free rate of interest r^. If it lends this capital to a debtor nation at a rate r>ro, its 
returns, PR are 
0 with probability -7t 
Thus in a perfectly competitive setting the creditors' loan supply schedule is obtained by 
solving 
l + r with probability 71 
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^'B;0,v^)(l+r) = (l+ro) (32) 
whence we obtain 
r = (33) 
As /r is decreasing'm B, r  will be increasing in 5. As a final qualification, we expect that 
there is a level of borrowing, B beyond which the probability of no-default is zero. That is 
\7t{B\e ,Vg) for B<B 
^~l 0 for B>B ^ 
Thus the resulting loan supply schedule is more specifically 
\r(B;e ,Vg,r^) for B<B 
'n  « forB>B 
In other words a credit ceiling is imposed. We will now proceed to outline the nature of the 
problem with default risk and its impact on resource allocation. 
Let us assume the optimization framework in section 4 with the following 
modifications. There is a positive probability of default. Default in period 2 leads to a ban 
from fiirther borrowing in period 2 and from trade in periods 2 and 3. A default in period 3 
leads to a ban fi-om trade in period 3. The interest rate on borrowangs made in period t is 
r, =r(Bj;0,Vg,rQ), t = 1,2. We shall also assume that the realization of 3 is knowm in 
advance and is equal to . Thus default risk is prompted by uncertainty in period 2 income. 
At the beginning of each period 1, , is realized so that only is unknown at the beginning 
of the planning horizon. 
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The decision problem confronting the debtor nation and the various outcomes in this 
model can be illustrated by the game tree in Figure 5.1 . The decision nodes are numbered to 
correspond to periods. Default/No-Default decisions are potentially made at nodes 2 and 3. 
Once a default decision is made no further decisions are needed since the choice variables for 
the rest of the planning horizon are determined. 
In period 1 the debtor nation starts off with a capital stock AT, and resource stock R 
and 9^ is known. Based upon this information set the debtor nation chooses the levels of the 
period 1 variables and makes contingent plans for the period 2 and 3 variables in order to 
maximize utility over the three period planning horizon. The levels of the period 1 decision 
variables are functions of the technology parameters, of and the expectations about 
that is, its mean and and variance g'. Let the probability density function of 6^, which is 
common knowledge, be represented by ). Then the expected value of 0., is given as 
= £(9^)= 
Also £(&•,') = J 6^ p{0^)d6^ and the variance of is 
2 J7r 2 T / r^r /o -IN 2 
Upon the arrival of period 2, the uncertainty about is resolved and the debtor nation 
revises its optimal solution for periods 2 and 3 decision variables. Let us first suppose that it 
pays off its debt. It may thus borrow again and decide in period 3 whether to default or not. 
However, since there is no uncertainty in period 3 one would expect that the creditor would 
respond by adjusting the lending terms so that it is never optimal to default in period 3. It is 
easier to approach this problem through a backward induction approach. Thus suppose we 
are in period 3. ATj is known, being determined by the period 2 investment decision. is 
knov^ since by the resource constraint, R^ = {\-\- g)- {R - R^) - {\ + g)R,. In the absence of 











Figure 5.1 Decision Tree of Debtor Nation 
between consumption and debt payment. If the debtor nation decides to make full payment 
its period 3 consimiption will be = 5/(/Cj, ) - (1 + /-j) . (36) 
If ii decides to default, period 3 consumption would be 
(37) 
Thus it will default if and only if 
(38) 
Thus to prevent default in period 3 the bank will impose the credit ceiling 
= (39) 
156 
Since this credit ceiling eliminates the possibility for period 3 defauh given that the 
debtor nation acts optimally, the probability of no-default in period 3 is 1. Thus the interest 
rate charged on 5, will be r^. That is, rj = so that 
Thus for any given production isoquant the credit ceiling for the debtor is known. We 
suppose that for this to be feasible the level of borrowing in period 2 is conditional on the 
levels of ATj and so that K^, R, and 5, are chosen simultaneously. 
Given the credit ceiling and that C, is given as a function of 5, we move to the next phase of 
optimization. The debtor nation chooses C, /?,, and 5, to maximize utility for the 
remaining horizon. More formally it solves; 
(l + rj (40) 
Max 
C2 , »-^2 ' ^3 
subject to 
UiC.J + SUiC,) (41) 
(1 + r,)B, + C, + I(K,) - a:, (1 -0-) < ejiK.,R.)  + 5, and 
C, = enK„R,)-{l+r,)B, 
The Lagrangian for this problem is 
i , '  =U(C,) + SU(efiK„R,)-i \  + r,)B,)  
The first order conditions will then be 




(l + 'o)^3 ^ 




Let us first consider an interior solution for C,, and R^. Firstly (42) and (45) imply that 
When the debt constraint is binding, <j)>0.  When it is not binding, ^ = 0. When the debt 
constraint is binding the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (MRS) is +ro. Thus 
when the debt constraint is binding, the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is higher 
than when it is not binding. 
The marginal products of the capital and natural resource inputs are also affected by 
the debt constraint. We have from (44) and (45) that 
However, the intratemporal marginal rates of technical substitution are not affected by 
whether the constraint is binding or not. We have in both cases. 




Ik, _ 4.(l + g) 
/rj 
Thus the intertemporal marginal rate of technical substitution is equal to the MRS when the 
debt constraint is not binding, but the former is greater than the latter when the constraint on 
borrowing is binding in which case the latter is equal to + Tq. The above six equation system 
can be solved for the optimal levels of the period 2 decision variables and the lagrange 
multipliers. When the optimal solutions imply a nonbinding debt constraint we will denote 
these by superscript A so that we have ^nd' functions of period 1 
decision variables and the parameters except y. By substitution we also have and . 
Thus the indirect utility function as a function of period 1 choice variables and the various 
parameters except y is given as 
On the other hand, if the optimal solution implies a binding credit constraint we have B.^= B 
and the optimal levels of the period 2 decision variables, and are now 
functions of y as well as the other parameters and period 1 decision variables. The indirect 
Let ^ be the indirect utility resulting firom a no-default decision in period 2. Then 
Now let us suppose that the debtor were to default in period 2. Then it consumes all 
its period 3 output so that consumption in period 3 is {K^,R^). In period 2 the 
value of its output is y9^f{K^,R,) and income is allocated to consumption and investment. 
No borrowing is allowed. The optimization problem in this case is 
^=V^{B„R„K,) = Uia^)+6U{C^^) (47) 
utility when the constraint is binding is 
(48) 




2 > ' 3 (49) 
subject to 
C,+I(K,)-K,{l-a)<0,j f iK,, l l)and 
C, = rWiK„R,) 
The corresponding Lagrangian is 
If  =U(C,)+dUirefiK,,R,))  +A,[e._TfiK„R,)-a-IiK,)  + K,il-cx)] 
with the first order conditions 
2 ~ ^2 ~ ^ 
- Sydo+g)fRU^+A, re.jr, = o 
=0 





The marginal rate of substitution, ydf^^, in this case is not dependent on the world rate 
of interest but rather endogenously on the marginal product of capital, and the severity of the 
default penalty. The penalty coefficient also affects the marginal rate of technical substitution. 
The optimal solutions are R^d and functions of the parameters and first period 
variables with the exception of 5.. The indirect utility function is 
Given the indirect utility functions for the default and no-default cases we can state the 
conditions under which a default decision will be made. Specifically, the debtor nation 
defaults if and only if 
.  > n i f l v r F l  v ^ \  u v hd ' • so > 
We may now proceed to obtain useful characterizations of the conditions which will 
lead to a default or no-default decision in period 2. In particular we may consider the space of 
period 1 decision variables which will lead to a default decision in period 2 and the space 
^ =Fo(/?„^,) = f/(CJ+<5C/(C3o) (54) 
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which will lead to a no-default decision. Period 1 variables of interest are 5,, i?, and K^. 
Furthermore we may also consider the parameter realizations that will lead to default. 
5.2.1: The Impact of Period 1 Borrowing 
The level of 5, has no impact on period 2 or period 3 consumption in the default 
scenario. On the other hand, consumption in periods 2 and 3 are both decreasing in in the 
no-default case. Thus we can establish the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: 
If there exists a level of borrowing for which the debtor nation is indifferent between a 
default and a no-default decision in period 2, then a default decision will occur at higher levels 
of period I borrowing and a no-default decision at lower levels of period 1 borrowing. 
Proof 
It is possible that ^ and ^ may not intersect for any value of 5, > 0. In that case the 
problem is trivial for it is always optimal to default (if ^ ) or it is always optimal to 
make full payment (if ^ >V,^\/BJ. However, if this is ruled out by existing parameter 
configurations then there exists a level of B,, call it B, ' such that (o,* ) = V^. Then given 
that Qm)' ^2nd decreasing in 5,, it follows that is decreasing in 
5,. Hence ^(5,) >^^(5,*) = as <5,* 
The impacts of other period 1 variables and exogenous parameters on the default/no-
default decision is more difficult to analyze without specific functional forms. An attempt was 
made at obtaining signs or analytical expressions for ^ where 
^ andX = However, no definite results were arrived at. Thus in 
lieu of an explicit analytical derivation, we present comparative static results in the next 
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section that will shed light on how all those parameters and predetermined variables aifect the 
choice variables in periods 2 and 3. 
5.3; Comparative Statics in The IVIodei With Default Rislt 
As in section 4.1 the comparative static resuhs here were obtained as the output of a 
program which was ran using Maple V Release 2 for UNIX. The comparative static 
expressions can be made available upon request from the author. The signs of these 
expressions are tabulated in Tables 2 and 3. 
TABLE 2: Comparative static results for the no-default, nonbinding credit constraint case 
s  g K.  9.  9 ,  cr 
- - + + + + - + 
-
Q - + + + + + 9 + -
0 0 + + - + 0 
0 0 4- -U - j- yj 
B2 + - ? + ? ? + 
A, + + - - + - + 
In Table 2 the signs for the no default scenario in which the credit constraint was 
nonbinding are reported. A higher level of period 1 borrowing reduces future consumption, 
increases future borrowing and has no impact on period 2 investment or the allocation of the 
remaining resource stock. As in the deterministic model, an increase in the discount factor 
defers consumption, reduces borrowing and has no impact on input allocations. Similarly, an 
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increase in the growth rate of the natural resource leads to an increase in period 3 resource 
extraction and capital stock and an increase in consumption for all periods while the impact on 
borrowing is ambiguous. 
A higher period 1 investment (period 2 capital stock) means more consumption in 
periods 2 and 3 but less borrowing in period 2 and less resource extraction and capital stock in 
periods. The same holds for an increase in An increase in 3 on the other hand leads to 
an increase in periods 2 and 3 consumption, period 2 borrowing, and period 3 input levels. 
Once again, a higher interest rate leads to deferred consumption. It also means decreased 
period 3 resource extraction and capital stock but an ambiguous impact on borrowing. An 
increase in the remaining stock of resources again has an income effect while an increase in 
the rate of depreciation reduces consumption in both periods and increases borrowing in 
period2. However, unlike the deterministic case it has no impact on period 3 resource 
extraction or capital stock. 
Comparing Tables 2 and 3 we notice some significant differences. In the default case 
represented in Table 3 a higher discount factor defers consumption as in the no default case, 
but this time it leads also to an increase in period 3 resource extraction and capital stock. A 
higher growth rate of the resource promotes deferrment of extraction to period 3 but a decline 
in period 2 investment for period 3 and also a decline in period 2 consumption. A higher 3 is 
more of a substitution effect this time as consumption in period 3 rises at the expense of that 
in period 2. Finally, an increase in the rate of depreciation leads to lower levels of resource 
extraction and capital stock in period 3 unlike the deterministic case where the impact was 
positive and the no default case in Table 2 where there was no impact. 
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TABLE 3: Comparative static results for the default case 
g A:. 0. ^3 cr 
a  - + ? + - -
C3 + ? 7 ? ? + -




+ + + + 
-
+ + - ? - + + 
5.4: The Period 1 Decision Problem 
In this section we wall consider the optimal decision making for the entire planning 
horizon. In period 1 the debtor nation solves for the optimal levels of all decision variables 
given the optimized level of future utility. Since the actual realization of is yet future, it 
will formulate expectations about the future utility stream. Thus given the above solutions to 




+ > C, +I{K^) -  K,{\-a) 
qV 
where F, = max(F4E\y^] = JV,p{e.^)dG,. 
^2 
Suppose we partition the domain of into 0'^ ,0^ and 0° such that for s , V., = , 
for ^,€0®, V^ = V^ ,and for = . Then 
6'' e' e" 
The corresponding Lagrangian is 
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t  ^U{C,) + SE{V,[R„B„K„r,e,]}+^[OJiK„R,) + B,-C,-I{K,) + K,{\-cr)] 
This gives us the first order conditions 
,-A, =0 (56) 
-^ + W«. =0 (57) 
^ - V . . = 0  ( 5 8 )  
+  / ^ , = 0  ( 5 9 )  
cB, 
JiK, ,R,)  + B,-C,-l{K,)  + K,i\-(7) = 0 (60) 
From (56) and (58) we have 
^ = c / /  
ac  ^ ' 
This says that we choose the investment level such that the marginal loss in period 1 utility 
due to investment is exactly offset by the marginal gain in expected discounted future utility. 
Pnu5»tir>nc ^ o r t A  ( ^ ' 1 \  
dcEV  ^
—:^  = UAfR I \JR. 
This suggests that we choose the period 1 resource use level such that the marginal expected 
discounted loss in future utility is exactly offset by the marginal gain in period 1 utility. 
Finally, equations (56) and (59) also imply that 
d^y\ 
<2ZJ, 
Thus the level of period 1 borrowing is chosen such that the marginal expected discounted 
loss in future utility fi:om inherited debt is equal to the marginal gain in period 1 utility. 
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Using I*, 5,, i?,, C, and can be solved for as functions of the exogenously given 
parameters of the system and the commonly held expectations about dj. Thus the possibility 
of default in period 2 depends upon the period 1 expectations held about through their 
impact on period 1 choice variables. As suggested earlier, the interest rate is increasing in B 
and Vg, the variance of $2, while it is decreasing in 9, the mean of 0,. Therefore, a higher 9 
and /or lower means a lower rate of interest and hence a lower unit cost of debt. This in 
turn implies that if the level of borrowing is inelastic with respect to the interest rate then a 
no-default decision is more likely. Conversely if borrowing is elastic with respect to the 
interest rate then a no-default decision is less likely. 
5.5: An Illustration With Specific Functional Forms 
At this stage it will be useful to illustrate the above model with specific functional 
forms for and /. In order to get closed form analytical solutions we may have to use some 
functional structures that do not have all the properties employed above. In the following we 
have chosen to use a logarithmic utility function so that 
fr \ - \ .nrr \  f  — f  VDl^ t  
For the production technology we will use 
f iK, ,R,)  =  ^ (xK, +{ \ -a)R,  (62) 
This structure restricts K, and R, to be perfect substitutes rather than complements. 
Fur thermore  i t  exhib i t s  decreas ing  re turns  to  sca le .  We also  assume here  tha t  1{K,)  = K, 
Using these specific functions the Lagrangian for the no-default two-period problem 
when the borrowing constraint is not binding is 
i ,"  =ln(C^) + S\n[e^K,+(\ -a)R,  - ( \  + r, )B,]  
- (1 + )B, + 5, -C2-K,+ K,(1 - a)] (63) 
The first order conditions are then; 
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-mi + gXl-a)  .  ^g , ( l -a)  
Iz^yjoK^ +(1-  a) i?3 l^ccK^ +( l -a)R,  
SBa 
2z^aK^ +(1- a)/?3 
= 0  
-^(l + O , A,  =0  
,y lccK,+i l -a)R.-( \  + r, )B,  +B,-C.-K^+K.i \ -<T) 
where = 0 ^ ccK^ +(l-a)/?3 - (1 + Tq )5, 
Solving (65), (66) and (67) we get (69) and (70) 
r ^.3 T 
r ae 1 
From (69) we solve for Ry as 
{ae,f-Aa{\  + gfK, 
4(l-a)(l + g)^ 
Applying the natural resource constraint to (71) we get 
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A{\ + gf{( \-a)R'^aK,]-{ae,y 
'  4(l-a)( l  +  ^ )  
Then substituting from (72) into (70) we obtain K, 
aef  .  (af t ) ' -4(H-g) ' t ( l -g)«"tgg,]  
"® [2(l+r„)]= 4(l-a)(i+g) < ' 
At this stage 5, and C, can be solved for simultaneously from (64) and (68) 




2 +^2(1 —cr) + (1+g) ,  2(I + ^ )-(1+''.)^.+^-^[0-«)^'+^2]|(75) (1 +  ^ )  [4( l+ro)  
Since C3 is equal to period 3 output minus debt payments in that period we have 
<5(l+ro)f  ae  ad^ (1 + ^ ), 
Thus the indircct utility functiGn for the no~dcikult cesc when tnc constraint on 5-, is not 
binding is given as 
I-hS) 
[^(l+rf (77) 
When the constraint on period 2 borrowing is binding we can proceed in a similar 
fashion. The Lagrangian is now 
= ln(C2 +C) + d\n[yd yJocK^ +{l-a)R^ ] (78) 
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+\{e.  ^ aK^+i\-a)R.  -  (1+r,  )B,  + ^ \e  4aK,+{\-a)R^ -  Q -  (1 -  a)] 
The first order conditions are; 
^ -^=0 (79) 
-Sm+gXl-a) , A,^(l  + g)(l-a) j l-y) ,  
2r,ylaK,+(\-a)R^ +(1-a)R^ 2^aK^+ i^-a)R^ (l  + r j  
——M^=-a 0-y )  .  .gj.  
2r,Va^3+(l-a)i?3 '  l^aK,+{\-a)R,  (l  + r^)  
0 ,yjaK^+(l-a)R,-( l+r,)B,+^-^e^aK,+(\-a)R,  -C.-K,+K.i \-a)  = 0 (82) 
where T^=yO -^jocK^ + (1 - a )R^ 
The solutions yield the same R, and R^ levels as before. 
{ad^f  -Aa{\  + g)-K,  
'^2ND ~ , v s 2 4 i j -Qr)(!  + g;  •^2M3 • 
4(1 + g)- [(1 - a)R' + - (a^, )^-
3nd - 77; tt; ; 4(l-o:)(i  + g) 
After various manipulations we obtain the optimal levels of consumption and period 2 capital 
investment as follows 
^2ND ~ {^^0 + 2fo-y/^o' "*"^1 "*"^1 I (83) 
=  7 " + ^ 2 ^ 0  V v + f ,  +  +  ^ o "  +  ^ 0  ^ jso'+s,  + a;:, + (1 - a);?''](84) 8a 8a '  2 4(1+^)  a  
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yd 
^3ND ~ ^ I 2^0 V^O ^1 I (85) 
where jj. = g(l + g)(l-;^) 
(l + /-o) ' 
ad^ 4 (2+<?) 2 
(1 + g)"^ 5a a 
rf2a-(l + g)l  (2^ 
8a(l + ^) ' 4Ja 
The indirect utility function in this case is 
B 
nd "*"^1 "*"^1 i" I ^ + £j  +£]  (86) 
The defauh scenario can also be solved using the same functional structures defined 
above. The Lagrangian for the two-period optimization is given as 
Lf =\n{C.^+6\viyd4cd<:^+(\-a)R,]+^ye.JaK.+{\-a)R, -C,-ATj+/:,(!-a)] (87) 
The first order conditions for an interior solution are; 
c ^ 
(88) 
-Sr&(l + g) i \ - a )  ^  A , y d , ( \ - a )  
2 r ,  yjoK^ +(1-  a) i?3 +(1 -  a)i? .  (89) 
Sf&a 
2z- ,  +(1-  a) /?3 
2 ,  = 0  (90) 
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+(1-«)-^ -Q -K^+Kj{\-o) -  0 (91) 
where , = 'JocK^+(l-a)Ri as before 
In this case the optimal natural resource extraction rates are 
4(l-a)(l  +  ^ )^ 
„ 4i \  + g) ' [ i l -a)R'  +aK,]-{raO,y-
4(l-«)(l + g) 
Comparing the resource extraction rates under this default scenario with that pertaining in the 
case of the no-default scenario produces some useful results. We note that 
n _ . A + >»• (94)  
Thus we can draw the following conclusion. 
Proposition 2: 
Given our production structure and logarithmic utility function the default scenario delays the 
extraction of resources relative to the no-default scenario. 
The capital investment in period 2 for the default scenario turns out to b£ 
air02y-i l+S)-4{l  + g) \ l -a)R'+2i \  + g)K,[S(\ -cT)-2( \  + g)]  
2{ \ + g )i2 + S )  
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By similar manipulations we can get the consumption levels for both periods as functions of 




The indirect utility function for the default scenario is thus given by 
,=wo^y 5a 
V 2  
a(Af , 2(HgXl-«)^ 
L2(l+g) (2+5) +A^[{2(l+g>5-lKl-o)+4(l+g)=] (98) 
5.6; Simulations For The Period 2 Decision Problem 
In this section we present results of computer simulations comparing the indirect utility 
functions for the three scenarios analyzed: default, no-default with binding credit constraint at 
the optimum, and no-default with nonbinding credit constraint at the optimum. In these 
simulations the period 1 decision variables have not been solved for but are rather taken as 
given. Thus we plot the various indirect utility functions against 5,, K^, /?,, and for 
various parameter scenarios. These plots are presented in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. We used the 
specific functional forms defined in Section 5.4 for all these simulations. For all the computer 
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simulations we used the Maple V software package for UNIX. No simulations have been 
reported here for the entire planning horizon. 
Generally, the indirect utilities for all three scenarios are increasing in 9^, as expected. 
It is not clear in general that the no-default utility rises faster with than the default utility. 
- 0 . 2  
Figure 5.2: Simulation results for all scenarios 
fn 
V" Nl)  
Figure 5.3: Simulation results for the no-deiault scenario 
/i, = l 
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6: CONCLUSION 
Most developing countries rely heavily on their natural resource base as a major source of 
income. Natural resources being related to production in the agricultural sector in most cases, this 
explmns why for many such countries agriculture accounts for a far greater share of income than 
the nonagricultural sectors. In this paper we considered the implications of resource extraction in 
such economies when foreign debt is used to finance capital investment. We considered the 
possibility of default risk and a likely creditor response. 
The results of this paper show that the ability to borrow in an international capital market at 
an exogenous interest rate shields resource extraction decisions from the discount rate or the rate 
of time preference of the debtor nation. However, when the interest rate is endogenous, being a 
function of the level borrowed, the rate of resource extraction is a function of the discount rate, and 
as in standard natural resource models, the higher the discount factor, the faster the rate of 
extraction. In general a higher interest rate also leads to a faster rate of extraction so that an 
increase in either or both of these parameters lead to less conservation of resources. 
The debt repayment requirements of a debtor nation imposes a burden on it to rapidly 
extract its natural resource reserves in order to meet its obligations. Thus if default were possible, 
the default outcome would likely lead to more conservation of the resource than a no default 
outcome gjven the same predefault conditions as a country which chooses to repay its debt. The 
creditor response was assumed to take into account the variability and mean of debtor nation 
income. These resuhs suggest that developing debtor nations might extract their resources more 
rapidly if under obligation to pay their debt within a specified period. If debt forgiveness is allowed 
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GENERAL SUMMARY 
In the three papers of this dissertation we have considered the role of natural resource 
issues in international trade and finance. The first paper considered static issues relating to 
trade patterns, production patterns and factor rewards when one of three inputs is a natural 
resource input. As this was static there was nothing 'natural resource' about the model per 
se, but it provided a useful illustration of how trade theorems are affected in a three-factor 
two good model. The second paper considered dynamic issues when positive marginal costs 
of extraction and different natural resource intensities are allowed for. Various useful 
propositions were established. Among the notable conclusions was the inference that 
production and trade patterns generally are cast in a dynamic setting. Thus static trade 
theorems explaining patterns of production and trade would not hold necessarily. 
Finally the third paper considered the application of such theorems to developing 
countries in particular. Current issues of imporance such as debt burden, default risk and 
income uncertainty were considered to see how these impact the rate of extraction of the 
natural resource. Further research in this area should consider the role of extraction 
technologies and resource renewability. 
180 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
ABBOTT, Philip C., and Stephen L. Haley; "International Trade Theory and Natural Resource 
Concepts", in Agricultural Trade and Natural Resources: Discovering the Critical Linkages, 
John D. Sutton (ed.),Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988. 
ANTLE, John M. and Richard E. Hewitt; "Economic Analysis of Agricultural Resources in an 
Open Economy: A Hybrid Model", in Agricultural Trade and Natural Resources: Discovering 
the Critical Linkages, JohnD. Sutton (ed.),Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988. 
BASU, Parantap and Dairyl McLeod, "Terms of trade fluctuations and economic growth in 
developing economies". The Journal of Development Economics, Nov., 1991, Vol. 37 no. 1-2: 
89-110. 
BOWEN, Harry P., "Changes in the International Distribution of Resources and their Impact on 
U.S. Comparative Advantage", Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 65 (1983): 402-414. 
BOWEN, Harry P., Edward E. Leamer, and Leo Sveikauskas, "Multicountry, Multifactor Tests 
of the Factor Abundance Theory", American Economic Review, Vol. 77, No.5 (December 1987): 
791-809. 
CHANG, P. H. Kevin, "Export diversification and international debt under terms of trade 
uncertainty: an international approach". The Journal of Development Economics, (Oct., 1991), 
Vol. 36 no. 2: 259-280. 
CHLARELLA, Carl; "Trade betweeen resource-rich and resource-poor economies as a differential 
game". Essay 19 in Exhaiisiibk Resources, Gptimaiity, and Trade, Kemp and Long (eds), North-
Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1980. 
CHLARELLA, Carl, Murray C. Kemp, Ngo Van Long and Koji Okuguchi; "On the Economics of 
International Fisheries", International Economic Review Vol. 25, No.l (February, 1984): 85-92. 
DELLAS, Harris, and Oded Galor, "Growth via external public debt and capital controls". 
International Economic Review Wo\. 33, No.2 (May, 1992): 269-282. 
de Pinies, Jaime, "Debt sustainability and overadjustment". World Development Vol. 17, No. 1 
(January, 1989): 29-43. 
DODARO, Santo, "Comparative Advantage, trade and growth: export-led growth revisited". 
World Development Vol. 19, No. 9 (September, 1991): 1153-1165. 
181 
EATON, Jonathan, The Allocation of Resources in an Open Economy with Uncertain Terms of 
Trade", International Economic Review Vol. 20, No.2 (June, 1979): 391-403. 
FARDMANESH, Mohsen, "Terms of trade shocks and structural adjustment in a small open 
economy: Dutch Disease and oil price increases". The Journal of Development Economics, Nov., 
1990, Vol. 34 no. 1-2: 339-353. 
FOLMER, Henk, Pierre V. Mouche, and Shannon Ragland, International environmental 
problems and interconnected games. Paper presented at the conference of environmental and 
resource economists, Stockholm, 10-14 June, 1991. 
FOSU, Augustine Kwasi, "Exports and economic growth: the African case". World Development 
Vol. 18, No. 6 (June, 1990): 831-835. 
HOEL, Michael, "Resource Extraction by a Monopoly with Influence over the Rate of Return on 
Non-Resource Assets", International Economic Review Vol. 22, No.l (February, 1981): 147-
157. 
JONES, Ronald W., and J. Peter Neary, "The Positive Theory of International Trade" in 
HcouHjook of International Economics, R. W. Jones and P. B. Kenen (eds.), North-Holland, 
1984. 
KEMP, Murray C. and Ngo van Long; "The Role of Natural Resources in Trade Models", in 
Handbook of Intematiortal Economics, R W. Jones and P. B. Kenen (eds.), North-Holland, 
1984. 
KEMP, Murray C. and Ngo van Long; "Rybczynski's Theorem in a Context of Exhaustible 
Resources: The Cass of Time-Contingent Pnces", IritemcitiOnal Ecoiionuc Review Vol. 23, No.3 
(October, 1982): 699-710. 
KEMP, Murray C. and Ngo van Long (eds). Exhaustible Resources, Optimality, arid Trade, 
North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1980. 
KEMP, Murray C. and Ngo van Long; "International trade with an exhaustible resource: A 
theorem of Rybczynski type". Essay 13 in Exhaustible Resources, Optimality, and Trade, Kemp 
and Long (eds), North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1980 and International 
Economic Review, Vol. 20, No.3, October, 1979: 671-677. 
KEMP, Murray C. and Ngo van Long; "Exhaustible resources and the Stolper-Samuelson-
Rybczynski theorems". Essay 14 in Exhaustible Resources, Optimality, and Trade, Kemp and 
Long (eds) North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1980 
182 
KEMP, Murray C. and Ngo van Long; "Exhaustible resources and the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theorem", Essay 15 in Exhaustible Resources, Optimality, and Trade, Kemp and Long (eds), 
North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1980. 
KEMP, Murray C. and Ngo van Long; "The interaction of resource-rich and resource-poor 
economies". Essay 17 in Exhaustible Resources, Optimality, coid Trade, Kemp and Long (eds), 
North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1980. 
KEMP, Murray C. and Ngo van Long; "Optimal tariffs on exhaustible resources". Essay 16 in 
Exhaustible Resources, Optimality, and Trade, Kemp and Long (eds), North-Holland Publishing 
Company, Amsterdam, 1980. 
KEMP, Murray C. and Ngo van Long; "International monopoly-monopsony power over 
exhaustible resources". Essay 18 in Exhaustible Resources, Optimality, and Trade, Kemp and 
Long (eds), North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1980. 
KEMP, Murray C. and H. Suzuki, "International trade with a wasting but possibly replenishable 
resource", International Economic Review, 16; No.3, October,1975,712-732. 
KHAN, Mohsin S. and Carmen M. Reinhart, "Private investment and economic growth in 
developing countries". World Development Wo\. 18, No. 1 (January, 1990); 19-27. 
KRUTILLA, Kerry, "Environmental Regulation in an Open Economy", Journal of 
Environmental Elconomics and Management, Vol. 20 (1991): 127-142. 
LEAMER, Edward E., Sources of Intematioml Comparative Advantage: Theory and Evidence, 
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984. 
LONG, Ngo Van, "International borrowing for resource extraction", Intematioml Economic 
Review, 15; No.l February 1974; 168-183. 
McGLHRE, Martin C., "Regulation, Factor Rewards, and International Trade", Joumal of Public 
Economics, Vol. 17 (1982); 335-354. 
MOSCHOS, Demetrios, "Export expansion, growth and the level of economic development; an 
empirical analysis", Tne Jourml of Development Economics, idxi., 1989, Vol. 30 no. 1; 93-82. 
NEWBERY, D. M., "Oil Prices, Cartels and the Problem of Dynamic Inconsistency", Economic 
JournalVol. 91; 617-646. 
ONO, Hiroshi, "Note on "International Trade with an Exhaustible Resource; A Theorem of 
International Economic Review Wq\. 23, No.l (February, 1982); 165-170. 
183 
PEARSON, C., Down to Business: Multinational Corporations, the Environment and 
Development, Washington, D.C.; World Resources Institute, 1985. 
PERRINGS, Charles, "An optimal path to extinction: Poverty and resource degradation in the 
open agrarian economy". The Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 30 (January 1989), no. 1: 
1-24. 
PETHIG, Rudiger, "Pollution, Welfare, and Environmental Policy in the Theory of Comparative 
Advantage", Journal of Environmental Economics and Marmgement Vol. 2 (1976): 160-169. 
SEGERSON, Kathleen, "Natural Resource Concepts in Trade Analysis", in Agricultural Trade 
and Natural Resources: Discovering the Critical Linkages, John D. Sutton (ed.),Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1988. 
SIEBERT, Horst, "Environmental Quality and the Gains from Trade", Kyklosydi. 30 (1977) 
Fasc.4: 657-673. 
STATISTICAL Yearbook, United Nations, Various Issues, 1967-1992. 
STONICH, Susan C., "Struggling with Honduran poverty: the environmental consequences of 
natural resource-based development and rural transformations". World Development Vol. 20, No. 
3 (March, 1992): 385-399. 
STRAND, Jon, "Foreign aid, capital accumulation, and developing country resource extraction". 
The Journal of Development Economics, Jan., 1992, Vol. 38 no. 1: 147-164. 
SUTTON, Jorin D., Agricultural Trade and Natural Resources: Discovering the Critical 
Linkages, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988. 
TAWADA, M., "A Note on International Trade with a Renewable Resource", International 
Economic Review (February 1982) 23 (1): 157-163. 
TOBEY, James A, "The Efifects of Domestic Environmental Policies on Pattems of World 
Trade: An Empirical Test", Kyklos, Vol. 43 (1990) Fasc.2: 191-209. 
VOUSDEN, N., "International trade and exhaustible resources: A theoretical model". 
International Economic Review, 15:149-167. 
WALTER, Inge, "Environmentally Induced Industrial Relocation to Developing Countries", in 
Environment and Trade, S. J. Rubin and T. R Graham (eds.), Allanheld, Osmum, and Publishers, 
1982:67-101. 
184 
WALTER, Ingo, and J. Ugelow, "Environmental Policies in Developing Countries", Ambio, 8 
(1979): 102-109. 
WTTHAGEN, Cees, Economic Theory coid International Trade in Natural Exhaustible 
Resources', no.253 of Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, Beckmann and 
Krelle (eds); Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1985. 
185 
APPENDIX 1 
Program for Rvbczvnski Simulations 
B :=array(1..100, 1..3): 
for i from 1 by 1 while i < 100 do 
B[i,l] :=i: 
B[l,3] ;=.l; 
if irem(i, 10) > 0 then B[i+1, 3] := B[i, 3] + .1 fi: 
if irem(i, 10) = 0 then B[i+1, 3] := .1 fi: 
B[l,2] :=.l; 
if irem(i, 10) > 0 then B[i+1, 2] := B[i, 2] fi: 
if irem(i, 10) = 0 and B[i, 2] < 1 then B[i+1, 2] := B[i, 2] + .1 fi: 
if irem(i, 10) = 0 and B[i, 2] = 1 then B[i+1, 2] := .1 fi: 
od: 
B[100,l] := 100: 





PI := 1: 
P2 := 2: 
Y1 :=-Wl*Ll -R1*K1 -Pe*El : 
FI :=(Ere)*((Kl^a)*(Ll^(l-a)))^(l-e): 
fll :=diff( Y1 ,L1 ) + ql*(difiE(Fl ,L1 )) = 0 : 
m := diff( Y1, Kl) + ql*(diffi: FI, Kl)) = 0 : 
n '5 — v i  t7i n _i_ tti m w — a . 11-/ viiiiy XI, ^ 1 j • vji \^v»iii\^ 11^x^1 j j —  V / .  
fl4 :=F1 - Ql = 0 : 
sOl := solve( {01,02,03,04 }, { LI, Kl, El, ql }): 
assign(sOl): 
Ll,Kl,El,ql: 
Y2 := -W1*L2 - R1*K2 - Pe*E2 : 
F2 := (E2^f)*((K2^b)*(L2'^(l-b)))^(l-f) : 
f21 := diflE( Y2, L2 ) + q2*(diff( F2 , L2 )) = 0 : 
rr>^ jircY \r^ \ i T?O rro w _ A . 
uuiv^ 1 ^  , xvz, ) ^ y )) ~ ^ ' 
f23 := diff( Y2 , E2 ) + q2*(diff( F2 , E2 )) = 0 : 
£24 := F2 - Q2 = 0 : 
s02 := solve( {f21,f22,f23,f24 }, { L2, K2, E2, q2 } ) : 
assign(s02): 
L2,K2,E2,q2: 
TCll :=W1*L1 +R1*K1 +Pe*El : 
TCI2 :=W1*L2 + R1*K2 +Pe*E2 : 
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dTCll :=dig(TCll,Ql); 
dTC12 := diff(TC12, Q2): 
01 ;=log(dTCll) = log(Pl): 
f32 := log(dTC12) = log(P2): 
Gls := siinplify(f31): 
f32s := simpHfy(f32); 
gla :=E1 +E2-E: 
g2a ;=K1 +K2-K: 
g3a ;= LI + L2 - L : 
ga ;= solve( { g2a = 0, g3a = 0 }, { Ql, Q2}); 
assign(ga); 
Q1,Q2: 
dQlRe := diff{Ql, Rl): 
dQlWe- dif{(Ql,Wl): 
dQ2Re := diff(Q2, Rl); 
dQ2We ;= diff(Q2, Wl): 
si := solve( {f31s, G2s }, { Wl, Rl }); 
assign(sl): 
W1,R1; 
De := diff( gla, Pe); 
DeE:=diff(gla,E): 
DeL := diff( gla, L); 
DeK ;= diff(gla, K); 
dPeE ;= -DeE/De; 
dPeK ;= -DeK/De: 
dPeL := -DeL/De: 
Ylb ;= -W*Llb - R2*Klb - Pe2*Elb : 
T71U — lUA/'l . X iu C) a) \^ '^ ))) • 
fl lb := diff( Ylb, Lib) + qlb*(diff( Fib, Lib)) = 0 : 
n2b := diff( Ylb, Klb) + qlb*(diff( Fib , Klb )) = 0 : 
f l3b ;= diff(  Ylb ,  Elb)  + qlb*(diff i :  F ib  ,  Elb))  = 0  :  
f l4b :=Flb-Qlb = 0 :  
sOlb := solve( {fllb,fl2b,fl3b,fl4b }, { Lib, Klb, Elb, qlb )): 
assign(sOlb); 
Llb,Klb,Elb,qlb: 
Y2b -W*L2b - R2'^K2b - Fe2*E2b ; 
F2b ;= (E2b'^f)*((K2b^b)*(L2b'^(l-b)))^(l-f); 
f2lb := diflE( Y2b , L2b ) + q2b*(diff( F2b , L2b )) = 0 ; 
f22b ;= diffi: Y2b, K2b) + q2b*(diff( F2b, K2b)) = 0 : 
f23b ;= diff( Y2b , E2b ) + q2b*(diff( F2b , E2b )) = 0 ; 
f24b ;= F2b - Q2b = 0 : 




TC21 := W*Llb + R2»Klb +Pe2*Elb : 
TC22 ;= W*L2b + R2*K2b +Pe2*E2b : 
dTC21 :=diff(TC21,Qlb); 
dTC22 ;= diff(TC22, Q2b): 
f41 :=log(dTC21) = log(Pl): 
f42 ;= log(dTC22) = log(P2): 
f41s := simplify(f41): 
f42s ;= simplify(f42): 
g ib  ;=Elb + E2b-Eb ;  
g2b;=Klb + K2b-K; 
g3b :=Llb + L2b-L:  
gb ;= solve( { gib = 0, g2b = 0 }, { Qlb, Q2b}); 
assign(gb): 
Qlb,Q2b: 
dQlRl := diff(Qlb, R2): 
dQlPel:= difiE(Qlb, Pe2); 
dQ2Rl ;= difln:Q2b, R2): 
dQ2Pel ;= diffi[Q2b, Pe2): 
s2 := solve( (f41s, f42s }, { Pe2, R2 }): 
assign(s2); 
Pe2,R2; 
Dw ;= diflf( g3b , W): 
DwE := diff(g3b , Eb): 
DwL := diff( g3b , L): 
DwK := difl(g3b , K): 
dWL ;= -DwL/Dw: 
dWE ;= -DwE/Bw; 
dWK ;= -DwK/Dw: 
Ylc := -W3*Llc - R»Klc - Pe3*Elc ; 
Flc := (Elc'^e)*((Klc^a)*(Llc'^(l-a)))^(l-e): 
flIc := diff( Ylc, Lie) + qlc*(diff( Flc, Lie)) = 0 : 
fl2c := diff( Ylc , Klc) + qlc*(diff( Flc, Klc)) = 0 : 
flSc ;= diff( Ylc , Elc ) + qlc*(difE( Flc , Elc )) = 0 ; 
f l4c :=Flc-Qlc = 0 ;  
sOlc :=soive( {fllc,fl2c,fl3c,fl4c }, { Lie, Klc, Elc, qlc } ); 
assign(sOlc): 
Llc,Klc,Elc,qlc: 
Y2c := -W3*L2c - R*K2c - Pe3*E2c : 
F2c ;= (E2c^f)*((K2c^b)*(L2c'^(l-b)))^(l-f) ; 
f2lc  := diff(  Y2c ,  L2c )  + q2c*(diff(  F2c ,  L2c))  = 0  :  
f22c ;= diff( Y2c , K2c ) + q2c*(diff( F2c, K2c)) = 0 : 
f23c := diff(  Y2c ,  E2c )  + q2c*(diff(  F2c ,  E2c))  = 0 ;  
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f24c := F2c - Q2c = 0: 
s02c := solve( {f21c,f22c,f23c,f24c }, { L2c, K2c, E2c, q2c }): 
assign(s02c): 
L2c,K2c,E2c,q2c: 
TC31 :=W3*Llc + R*Klc+Pe3*Elc; 
TC32 ;= W3*L2c + R*K2c +Pe3*E2c : 
dTC31 ;=diff(TC3l,Qlc); 
dTC32 := diff(TC32, Q2c): 
f5l ;=log(dTC31) = log(Pl); 
f52 := log(dTC32) = log(P2): 
fSls  := simplify(f51):  
f52s := simplify(f52): 
glc := Elc + E2c - Ec : 
g2c :=Klc + K2c-K: 
g3c := Lie + L2c - L : 
gc •= solve( { glc = 0, g3c = 0 }, { Qlc, Q2c}): 
assign(gc): 
Qlc,Q2c. 
dQlWk := diff(Qlc, W3): 
dQlPek := diff(Qlc, Pe3); 
dQ2Wk := diff(Q2c, W3); 
dQ2Pek ;= diff(Q2c, Pe3): 
s3 ;= solve( {fSls, f52s }, { Pe3, W3 }); 
assign(s3): 
Pe3,W3: 
Dr := dif!( g2c, R): 
DrE := diff( g2c, Ec); 
DrK ;= difF( g2c , K); 
DrL := diff( g2c, L): 
dRK ;= -DrK/Dr; 
dRE := -DrE/Dr: 
dRL ;= -DrL/Dr: 
E ;= 100: 
Eb ;= 100; 
Ec := 100: 
L ;= 100; 
K := 100: 
El ;=E1; 
E2 ;= E2: 
Klc :=Klc:  
K2c :=K2c: 
Lib :=Llb;  
L2b ;=L2b: 
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Pe := fsolve( gla = 0, Pe): 
W:=W1: 
R:=R1:  
De := De: 
Dr ;= Dr: 
Dw := Dw: 
dQlWk ;= dQlWk; 
dPeE := dPeE: 
dPeK ;= dPeK; 
dPeL := dPeL: 
dWL := dWL: 
dWE ;= dWE: 
dWK ;= dWK; 
dRK := dRK; 
dRE ;= dRE: 
dRL ;= dRL; 
dQlE := dQlRe*dRE + dQlWe*dWE; 
dQ2E := dQ2Re*dRE + dQ2We*dWE: 
dQlK := dQlPek*dPeK + dQlWk*dWK; 
dQ2K := dQ2Pek*dPeK + dQ2Wk*dWK; 
dQlL ;= dQlRl*dRL + dQlPePdPeL; 
dQ2L := dQ2Rl»dRL + dQ2Pel*dPeL: 
appendto(niapl): 
Y •= 'f*' 
T ;= array(i..i, 1..7); 
T[i , l ] :=i :  
T[i, 2] ;= dQlE; 
111, jj ;= 
T[i,4] ;= dQlK; 
T[i, 5] := dQ2K; 
T[i, 6] ;= dQlL: 
T[i, 7] := dQ2L: 
print(T); 
a •= 'a'; 
b := V: 
e := 'e'; 
f := ' f :  
Pe := 'Pe': 
W1 ;='Wr: 
R1 :='Rr: 
Pe2 ;= 'Pe2': 
W3 := 'WS': 
R2 ;= 'R2': 
190 
Pe3 : = •Pe3*; 
W:= W; 
R:= R': 
El := z-El ' ;  
LI := ^ •Ll ' :  
K1 ;= ^ -Kl ' :  
E2 ;= •E2': 
L2 := •L2'; 
K2 ;= = 'K2': 
Elb = 'Elb'; 
Lib = 1.^: 
Klb ;= -Klb'; 
E2b = •E2b': 
L2b = •L2b'; 
K2b ;= •K2b': 
Elc  = 'Elc': 
Lie  = 'Llc': 
Klc := 'Klc'; 
E2c = 'E2c': 
L2c = •L2c': 
K2c := 'K2c': 
ql := = 'ql': 
q2:= = 'q2': 
q lb  = 'qlb': 
q2b = 'q2b': 
q lc  = 'qlc': 
q2c = 'q2c'; 
t; — rni. 
Jut . 
Eb:= = 'Eb': 





Q l :  = 'Q1': 
Q2:  = 'Q2': 
Qlb := 'Qlb': 
/^OU 
. 
Qlc := 'Qlc': 




Summary of  model  features  in  var ious vers ions of  the General ized H-0 Model  
MODEL I MODEL II MODEL III MODEL IV 
Restrictions a,  =a2, i i  =0 n = 0  a ,  =a2 None 





m - r / ( l - a )  
L U s - m C  Jna+(l-a)^, J(/'.+5n) 
PAO r r (l-a)(P<?-Ti)r 
r | a  + ( l - a ) P e  
r(Pe-r\)  
(Pe+5ri)  




Specialize in one 
good or produce 
both goods all 
the time 
5 possible production 
patterns: (1), (1,2), 1,2,3), 
(2,3) or (3) 
Various possible production 
patterns 
Various possible production patterns 
MODEL I: GHOM with equal natural resource intensities and no extraction costs (Kemp-Long, 1984) 
MODEL II: GHOM with different natural resource intensities and no extraction costs 
MODEL III; GHOM with equal natural resource intensities and positive marginal extraction costs. 
MODEL IV: GHOM with different natural resource intensities and positive marginal extraction costs. 
